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This report examines the sectarian backdrop for Galen of Pergamum's medical 
epistemology. It considers the justificatory role that experience (empeiria) and theoretical 
accounts (logoi) play in Empiricist and Dogmatist epistemology in an attempt to track 
how Galen incorporates experience into theoretical accounts as a means by which to 
undergird them. Finally, it briefly considers the exiguous evidence for Methodism, 
Galen's main medical rivals in the Roman world and claims that Galen forges a middle 
path between these sects.  
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This report will consider Galen's epistemological views with respect to medical 
knowledge. That is, it asks what constitutes medical knowledge for Galen, in particular 
what criteria he considered to be justificatory for epistemic medical claims. To that end, I 
will begin by considering the three schools of medicine whose epistemic claims Galen 
discusses at greatest length. Galen's criticisms of these three schools, the Dogmatists or 
Rationalists, the Empiricists, and the Methodists show a set of concerns, against which 
Galen's own epistemological views take shape. Second, I will outline Galen's overall 
arguments for the foundations of knowledge claims. Finally, I will lay out how Galen's 
commitment to empirical data, especially anatomical data, differed from 
contemporaneous views on evidentiary criteria for medical knowledge in an effort to 
show how Galen's approach to the question of what constituted justification of medical 
beliefs formed a substantive sea-change in the use of empirical evidence for medical 
knowledge. 
GREEK MEDICINE IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD 
 
Through the Classical period, it is difficult to separate Greek medicine from 
Greek philosophy. Traditionally, the emergence of Greek philosophy is tracked, as its 
main criterion of differentiation from other intellectual activity, by its expression of a 
certain causal picture that attempts to explain the natural world. Greek philosophy, on 




concomittant growth of interest in the investigation of natural or sub-lunar phenomena 
employing rational and empirical explanations.1 It is for this reason (which of course does 
not exclude others) that the so-called Pre-Socratic philosophers are said both to give rise 
to and to occupy a distinct branch on the genealogical tree of Greek intellectual history.2 
Greek medicine follows similar suit; consequently, ancient Greek medicine is usually 
said, certainly too neatly,3 to begin with Hippocrates and the Hippocratic corpus in the 
5th century BCE.4  
This similarity between rationality as the main taxonomical criterion both for 
ancient Greek philosophy and ancient Greek medicine is not accidental, in part because 
philosophy and medicine were overlapping fields of study in the ancient Greek world.5 
One prominent theme among the more philosophical writers of the Hippocratic corpus, 
which is similar to the tendency for theorizing about the composition of the natural world 
that Aristotle claims underlies philosophical theories from the 6th and 5th centuries, is an 
interest in arriving at rational theories of how human beings are constituted (e.g., De 
Vetere Medicina, De Natura Hominis, De Diaeta in Morbis Acutis, De Flatibus, etc.). As 
                                                
1 See, for example, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983: 7-8); Barnes (1979: 3-5) 
2 The term 'Pre-Socratic' is marked by being both misleading and entrenched. I use it for the latter reason. 
3 Other medical theorists, such as Alcmaeon of Croton, were certainly active in the early 5th century. 
Alcmaeon, preserved in Aetius (5, 30, 1= Alcmaeon DK 24B4), is the earliest surviving author to envision 
health as a matter of balance or equilibrium between opposites.  
4 For the overall context both of the messiness of this question and of the foundational role of the 
Hippocratic Corpus for Greek medicine, see (Nutton (2004: 37-71). On the Hippocratic question, Smith 
(1979) is still the benchmark. 




Frede notes, from the 5th century onward "philosophers regarded human physiology and 
pathology as part of natural philosophy."6 
Beginning most obviously with Aristotle and gaining full steam in the Hellenistic 
period, a greater interest in the relation of medicine to empirical observation began to 
make its way into medico-philosophical discourse.7 But, throughout the works of these 
authors, the notion, for many reasons unobjectionable, persists that there is some 
theoretical picture underlying observable phenomena, from and to which one can make 
inferences with the proper tools.  
As different versions of this theoretical picture blossomed, resistance arose to the 
very notion that health and illness had to be or even could be adequately explained in 
terms of some underlying theoretical scaffolding.8 The Empiricists, so-called because of 
their adherence to experience (ἐμπειρία) rather than theoretical accounts (λόγοι), 
rejected the notion that hidden (ἄδηλα) entities could be medically explanatory. This 
rejection was in virtue of the fact that they could not be observed directly and that direct 
observation (αὐτοψία) or its adequately verified reports (ἱστορία), for the Empiricists, 
was a necessary condition for epistemic claims.9 Through their rejection of explanations 
that involved hidden or non-evident entities, an increasingly formal distinction between 
these two schools of thought took shape.  
                                                
6 Frede (1985: xx) 
7 This tendency is not absent in the Hippocratic corpus. It is, for example, present in De Vetere Medicina, 
De Natura Hominis, and De Morbo Sacro. I only mean that systematic treatment of the role of observation 
in philosophy and medicine only really takes flight under Aristotle and the Peripatos.  
8 See, for example, Frede (1990: 229) on the role of mere plausibility had in the emergence of Empiricism.  





By the second century CE, physicians in the Greco-Roman world had come to 
distinguish themselves from one another generally on the basis of their commitments to 
just these sorts of broad views. And, by the time Galen comes onto the scene, the 
disagreements between these various sects or haireseis had become entrenched. 
MEDICAL SECTS IN THE SECOND CENTURY  
 
Greek medical sectarianism had really crystallized in the Hellenistic period along 
with the subsequent ramification of philosophy into schools or sects.10 Although what 
precisely constituted a medical sect or hairesis is not entirely clear, a workable definition 
for my purposes is a group of practitioners or thinkers with a shared intellectual 
methodology, along the lines of Nutton's provisional description,  
"[a]lmost always, however, the word 'sect' is best interpreted as a shared 
ideology rather than any official institution and hierarchy. But, as in 
philosophy, there was no easy means of securing adherence to the doctrine 
of every sect in every particular, and there were ample opportunities for 
individual interpretations of the words of one's distinguished 
predecessors."11 
 
                                                
10 See, for example, Von Staden (1982: 80-81). In particular p. 81, regarding naming conventions for the 
titles of works (themselves largely an Alexandrian innovation), "Unlike the medical hairesis tradition, 
however, the early philosophical usage is not associated with a substantial body of treatises called 'On 
hairesis x' or 'Against hairesis y.' This reinforces the impression that Greek medicine is the more 
significant early nurturing ground for hairesis as a doctrinal group designation. No later than the second 
century CE, however, hairesis also had become a standard term for philosophical 'school'- and for religious 
'sect'..." 
11 Nutton (2004: 147). See also, Von Staden (1982: 79-80), "The paucity of testimonia concerning the 
content of the Alexandrian hairesis literature unfortunately leaves us only vaguely informed about what 
qualifies a group for the label hairesis or what qualifies an individual for membership in a hairesis. But the 
evidence suggests that a group with fairly coherent and distinctive theories, with an acknowledged founder 
(hairesi-arches), and with publicly identifiable leaders who articulate (a) their rejection of rival theories 
through theoretically founded polemics, as well as (b) their own systematic alternatives, would qualify as a 





By the second century CE, however, three medical sects (haireseis) dominated the 
medical landscape in Rome: the Dogmatists (δογματικοί) also frequently called the 
Rationalists (λογικοί),12 the Empiricists (ἐμπειρικοί), and the Methodists (μεθοδικοί).13 
Our main witness to the actual therapeutic practice of these three sects is Galen. The 
joints along which he carves out distinctions between these sects are generally 
epistemological rather than practical. Variously, he testifies to the similarities between 
competent Dogmatists and Empiricists with respect to treatment. For example, in his 
propaedeutic treatise on medical sects, De Sectis, he makes the following remarks,14  
They say that the dispute about non-evident things (ἄδηλα) is insoluble, 
not about the evident (φαινόμενα). For from this starting point each 
thing, when it becomes evident what sort of thing it is, argues on behalf of 
those who are telling the truth and refutes those who are not. Empiricists 
and Dogmatists disagree about innumerable things of this kind while 
providing the same treatment in the cases of the same illnesses (at least 
those who have been trained correctly in each sect).15 
 
                                                
12 The term "Rationalist," with its emphasis on λόγος can be somewhat misleading and I tend to prefer to 
use the term "Dogmatist" for that reason. The term λογικοί does not arise because the Dogmatists either 
had or claimed to have exclusive rights to reasoning in their medical practice; rather, it appears to have 
arisen because their practice involved a particular kind of reasoning. They were associated with λόγος, in 
the sense that they were committed to inference from a priori claims about the natural world to treatment 
and diagnosis of disease. Other medical sects, of course, could and did have a rational method. See, e.g., 
Barnes (1991: 53 n. 13). 
13 See Von Staden (1982: 77). Cf. Galen, De Sectis, I 64-65, 73; ps.-Galen, De Optima Secta, I 118; ps.-
Galen, Def. med. XIX 353  
14 There is still no strict orthodoxy in references to the texts of Galen. My references are all to the volume 
and page numbers in the Kühn edition of Galen as the texts contained in it either remain critically 
authoritative or are referenced in the margins of editions that supercede them. Consequently, my references 
will mention the Latin name of the text first, then the Kühn volume number in Roman numerals, followed 
by its page in Arabic numerals (e.g., De Sectis, I 64). 
15 De Sect. I 79 ἀνεπίκριτον δὲ τὴν περὶ ‖ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνομολογίαν εἶναί φασιν, οὐ τὴν περὶ τῶν 
φαινομένων. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἕκαστον φανὲν οἷόν ἐστι μαρτυρεῖ μὲν τοῖς ἀληθεύουσιν, ἐξελέγχει δὲ 
τοὺς ψευδομένους. τοιαῦτα μυρία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἐμπειρικοί τε καὶ δογματικοὶ τὴν 
αὐτὴν θεραπείαν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν παθῶν ποιούμενοι, ὅσοι γε νόμῳ καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν 




Just as regularly, as in the passage from De Sectis above, he makes their 
explanations of medical phenomena the central differentiating criterion that sets them at 
odds with one another and individuates them with respect to other sects.16 That is, the 
Empiricists and the Dogmatists had different and incompatible commitments to the 
justificatory role that so-called ἄδηλα or non-evident causes, entities, and structures 
could play in claims about medical knowledge. This epistemological conflict and the 
effects that it had on medical discovery, according to Galen, differentiated the competent 
Empiricist and the Dogmatist more than practical or even observational differences 
regarding φαινόμενα or evident causes. According to Frede (1990: 225), for example, 
Empiricists distinguished themselves from Dogmatists in that, 
they took the view that knowledge is just a matter of experience (in Greek 
empeiria), wheareas the rationalists were so called since they assumed that 
mere experience, however complex, does not amount to knowledge, that 
knowledge crucially involves the use of reason (logos in Greek, ratio in 




As Frede notes, shortly after this quotation, quite a bit rides on just what is meant 
here by reason or inference. The Empiricist did not wholly dismiss reasoned activity with 
respect to medical diagnosis and treatment. Clearly, any sort of diagnosis and choice of 
treatment involved some level of reasoned activity, although perhaps not unambiguously 
from an ancient Greek perspective. What Empiricists disagreed about, to varying degrees, 
                                                
16 See especially De Sect. I 65, 96 




was what sorts of reasoning were epistemically reliable. Low level, informal,18 reasoning, 
and in particular memory,19 which had bundled into itself a power to form empirical 
generalizations of the sort that could be congenial to Empiricist epistemology appear to 
have been generally acceptable to them. Reasoning, of the sort engaged in by Dogmatists, 
to and from non-evident causes, however, was at best suspect and at worst provided no 
epistemic warrant at all.20  
At the heart of this dispute lie both differing commitments to causal explanations 
and to non-evident structures or causes. Therefore, a fortiori, they differed in their 
commitments to the sorts of inferences, if any, one can be justified in making both to and 
from these structures. Galen develops this second point shortly before this passage from 
De Sectis above, where he also reiterates similarities in treatment,  
And to speak generally, the Dogmatists and Empiricists use the same 
treatments for the same illnesses, while they disagree regarding the 
manner of their discovery (here εὕρεσις). Since, as far as the Dogmatists 
go, in cases of symptoms manifest in the body there is an indication 
(ἔνδειξις) of the cause (αἰτία), from which they find a therapy. On the 
other hand, as far as the Empiricists are concerned there is a reminder 
(ὑπόμνησις) of frequent and similar observations.21 
 
                                                
18 See Galen Comp.Med.Loc. XIII 362; Subfig.Emp. 87, 27 
19 On the role of memory in Empiricist epistemology, see generally Frede (1990), the source of the 
quotation above. 
20 This is perhaps overstated. See Subfig.Emp. 87, for some Empiricists that allow prima facie formal 
reasoning into medical practice (e.g., Heraclides of Tarentum and Menodotus, although the case of 
epilogismos is muddier).  
21 Sec.Int. I 73, καθόλου φάναι τὰς αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν παθῶν ἰάσεις οἵ τε δογματικοὶ καὶ οἱ 
ἐμπειρικοὶ παραλαμβάνουσι περὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς εὑρέσεως αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς 
αὐτοῖς φαινομένοις κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συμπτώμασιν ἔνδειξις μὲν τῆς αἰτίας γίγνεται τοῖς δογματικοῖς, 





Galen here, probably oversimplifying the Empiricist position for the sake of 
emphasizing methodology over actual treatment, stresses the epistemological difference 
between Empiricist approaches to what constitute evidentiary criteria for medical 
knowledge claims and Dogmatist notions of evidentiary criteria. In effect, this difference 
lies in the incompatibility between their analyses of how the correct treatment was to be 
found, the process of discovery (εὕρεσις), and in what terms illness was to be 
understood.  
For the Empiricist, etiological explanations (αἰτία) or explanations that involved 
non-directly observable structures (ἄδηλα) were anathema.22 Rather, the Empiricist 
depended on correlations (ὑπομνήσεις) between past and present evident phenomena. 
The Dogmatist on the other hand, embraced causal explanations, unobservable structures, 
and indication (ἔνδειξις) or formal inference involving these sorts of structures.  
  
                                                
22 Empiricists also considered "anatomical issues" ἀνατομία (i.e., issues of anatomy and dissection), for 
reasons that I will detail at greater length subsequently, as belonging to the class of explanations involving 
non-evidents on the grounds that one could treat anatomical structures observed in dead bodies as being the 







The Dogmatists (δογματικοί) or sometimes the Rationalists (λογικοί), are so 
named Galen suggests, not on the grounds that they were especially good logicians23 nor 
especially tied to logic24 but because they subscribed to beliefs (δόγματα) about the 
natural world that involved items, which were non-evident by nature.25 As a preliminary 
sketch, one can say that the Dogmatists proceeded from the notion that health and disease 
were to be understood primarily in a theoretical framework of universal claims about the 
physical world or at least about human bodies. The Dogmatist comes to a treatment plan 
by inference first to and then from certain intelligible but not necessarily observable 
truths about the nature of the world (e.g., that opposites treat opposites, that certain 
externals such as location or season were part of a contagion theory of disease, that 
nothing happens without a cause, etc.).26  
These claims express certain propositions about the natural world, to which 
Dogmatists believed one could infer from evident phenomena through a process, called 
                                                
23 Cf. Praen. XIV 605; Pecc.Dig. V 71 
24 See, e.g., Ord.Lib.Prop. XIX 52; UP III 837; Pecc.Dig. V 71; et passim 
25 Cf. Sextus, PH I. 13; Galen, Sect.Int. I 65; but see, contra, Ars Med. I 305-6. On the role of logic in 
medicine before Galen generally, see Barnes (1991: 50-54). 
26 The Hippocratic corpus and the Galenic corpus are littered with examples of this notion that opposites 
cure opposites. See, e.g., Loc. Hom., Galen MM X 102-4, 178, 650, 739, et passim; Galen often criticizes 
other doctors, particularly Methodists for failing to take into account circumstantial factors surrounding 
patients, such as location, season, age, etc. See Galen PHP V 389-90 et passim. Many of these 





'indication' or ἔνδειξις.27 Once those propositions were apprehended, the Dogmatist 
could in turn deductively infer a treatment plan. In other words, the doctor would arrive 
at diagnostic facts about the patient and through indication then, in virtue of those facts, 
produce an effective treatment for the diagnosed illness.28  
SIGN INFERENCE: INDICATION AND EPILOGISMOS 
 
This feature of Dogmatist epistemology, indication (ἔνδειξις), has its roots in 
Hellenistic epistemology, where it was a heuristic tool used to discover medically 
relevant facts and treatments. Indication, in this technical sense, is a sign-inference; that 
is, indication is an inference from some evident fact, a sign, to some non-evident fact, 
something ἄδηλον. A paradigmatic instance of this sort of inference, for example, is an 
inference from sweat coming out from inside of some body, some fact X, to an 
unobservable fact Y, that the skin is porous, whose truth obtains in virtue of X. 
Consequently, indication (like epilogismos, which is a similar inferential move from 
some fact X to Y, where Y is rather another evident fact, although one not necessarily 
evident at the time)29 picks out not only a kind of conditional but also the epistemic status 
of its relata, in particular its consequent.  
                                                
27 These sets of examples, such as the environmental ones, as well as others such as the plethora of 
materially monistic accounts (if Aristotle is to be trusted), put a fine point on why indication could be 
suspect to Empiricists.  
28 In passing, it is important to mention that Dogmatists were not necessarily committed to the truth of the 
same set(s) of medical beliefs, although certain general beliefs are common to them (e.g., that one could 
infer to non-evident facts about the world on the basis of evident ones. See, for example, Galen MM X 17). 
29 For epilogismos see Sextus, PH 2.100-102; Galen Sec.Int. I. 78; Subf.Emp. 63, 69; Ps.-Galenus, 




Sextus offers the most detailed surviving accounts of the the epistemic status of 
these relata in PH 2.97-99, of which here 97-8, 
According to the Dogmatists, of these facts, some are evident and some 
are not non-evident; and, of the non-evident some are wholly non-evident, 
some are non-evident at a certain time, and some are non-evident by 
nature. They also say that a) evident facts come from themselves to our 
knowledge, (e.g., that is is daytime); and b) those things that are wholly 
non-evident, that they are what falls fundamentally beyond our 
understanding, (e.g., that the stars are numerically even); and c) those 
things that are non-evident at a certain time but have an evident nature are 
those that are non-evident at a certain time to us on account of external 
circumstances (e.g., for me now, the city of Athens); and d) those things 
that are non-evident by nature are those that have a nature that does not 
fall under our clear perception (e.g., intelligible pores). For, these are 
never apparent on their own but, if at all, they could be thought to be 




The two main classes of Sextus' division are into things that are evident to 
perception and things that are non-evident to perception. Of the second class, he further 
subdivides these non-evidents into facts that are in no way apprehensible, non-evidents 
that can otherwise be evident, and the class of non-evidents that is of concern in the 
debate regarding sign inference between the Empiricists and the Dogmatists (i.e. those 
non-evident by nature); it is from this methodological commitment to deduction from 
                                                
30 PH 2.97-98, Τῶν πραγμάτων τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς τὰ μέν ἐστι πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, 
καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν καθάπαξ ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα. καὶ 
πρόδηλα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, 
καθάπαξ δὲ ἄδηλα, ἃ μὴ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν κατάληψιν, ὡς τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς 
ἀστέρας, πρὸς καιρὸν δὲ ἄδηλα ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐναργῆ παρά τινας ἔξωθεν περιστάσεις 
κατὰ καιρὸν ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται, ὡς ἐμοὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, φύσει δὲ ἄδηλα τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα 
φύσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδέποτε ἐξ ἑαυτῶν 





claims about particulars to non-evident truths that the Dogmatists come also to be known 
as Rationalists (λογικοί) because of their commitment to an underlying explanatory 
account (λόγος).31  
As a technical term for Galen, "indication" refers to an inferential move from 
some evident feature of a particular to non-evident features of the class to which the 
particular belongs, a move that is made without the need of experience. Galen defines 
therapeutic indication at MM X. 126, "[w]e say that indication, so to speak, a reflection of 
the consequence. The consequence is also discovered by testing, but not so as to be 
reflected in the antecedent. And, for this reason, none of the Empiricists says that 
anything is reflected in anything else."32 As a qualification of this sort of definition Galen 
adds, at MM X. 127, "accordingly, the one who sets out to discover what follows from 
the very nature of the matter, without experience, is making the discovery through 
indication."33 The inferential move is more one from (a) the nature or essence of a 
particular (ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως) to (b) a non-evident feature of 
particulars in that class.34 A common example of this sort of inference regards porosity of 
the human body. From the evident fact, for example, that some particular person is 
sweating (really the generic fact that people do sweat), the Dogmatist might infer through 
                                                
31 See n.12, on the potential pitfalls of this association. 
32 MM X 126, τὴν γὰρ οἷον ἔμφασιν τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἔνδειξιν λέγομεν. εὑρίσκεται μὲν κᾀκ τῆς 
πείρας τὸ ἀκόλουθον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐμφαινόμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν ἐμπειρικῶν 
οὐδεὶς ἐμφαίνεσθαί φησι τῷδέ τινι τόδε τι. 
33 MM X 127: τὸν τοίνυν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως ὁρμώμενον ἐξευρίσκειν τὸ 
ἀκόλουθον ἄνευ τῆς πείρας ἐνδείξει τὴν εὕρεσιν ἔστι πεποιῆσθαι. 




indication that as a consequence of this generic truth about human beings that human 
bodies are porous, a consequence that is itself non-evident. 
The Empiricists, on the other hand, resisted certain generalizations about the 
physical world. They proceeded from the notion that health and disease could only safely 
be construed in terms of particular instances of disease. They determined the class of 
disease on the basis of observational similarity rather than some essential definition, 
which more than likely would have appealed to non-evidents. The Empiricists denied that 
one could do more than class these diseases as presenting similarly, generalizations that 
did not exclusively refer to direct observations were outside the purview of Empirical 
medicine.35 Diseases fell under the same category only insofar as they were the similarly 
and directly observed. Consequently, the effective Empiricist physician adhered to a 
regimen of treatment based exclusively on firsthand experience and a canon of case 
histories.  
Crucially, the Empiricist is not engaged in induction, at least not in any formal 
sense of induction.36 The aforementioned inferential move, called epilogismos, is still an 
inference from an evident fact (X) to another evident fact (Y). It is just the case that (Y) 
                                                
35 See Frede (1982), Frede (1990) 
36 I do not intend to use 'induction' here tendentiously. I mean it in a formal sense rather than the sense in 
which Frede reasonably attaches certain rational activities to memory on the Empiricist account. For 
example, Frede (1990: 226) regarding how a doctor comes to gain empirical knowledge, "But to assume 
this is not yet to assume that reason plays no role in our coming to have this kind of experience and the 
general belief which goes with it. And even less is it to assume that reason never plays a role in our coming 
to have this kind of experience and the corresponding general belief. To claim this seems to presuppose a 
particular conception of reason which is different from ours, a conception on which it is not true by 
definition that anything we would call 'inference' or 'reasoning' will be a function of reason. It rather seems 





happens not to be evident at the time. For example, consider the case of smoke and fire, 
where some Empiricists will allow the epilogistic move on the grounds that one has seen 
a sufficient number of instances of smoke correlated with fire to make the inferential 
move from the former to the latter in a case where the fire is not apparent, at that 
moment.  
Nonetheless, for the Empiricist, theoretical commitments involving naturally non-
evident facts and, in particular, causal explanations were largely seen as a liability. To the 
point that, at least for the hardline Empiricist, reference to or inference from things that 
could not be directly observed were to be wholly eschewed.37 And at that, the Empiricist 
would require certain restrictions on the degree of formality allowed in inference. 
Experience and case histories provided the physician with a wealth of comparanda to 
which a given particular case could be compared. Upon finding a sufficiently similar case 
or cluster of cases, the physician would infer that whatever treatments were successful in 
those cases would likely be successful in the case at hand. This process called 
epilogismos was associative (sometimes ἐπιλογισμός was opposed to ἀναλογισμός, a 
synonym for indication in the sense of inference to hidden conditions)38 and unlike 
indication purported to rely on no propositional claims involving non-directly observed 
entities. That is epilogismos was a certain type of knowledge by acquaintance.39 It could 
not and did not purport to reveal propositional truths about theoretical entities or even the 
                                                
37 Cf. Galen Subfig.Emp. 82; Med.Exp. 95 
38 See Frede (1990: 232-3) 




natural world, on the grounds that knowledge does not range over these sorts of things 
but only over evident phenomena.40  
  
                                                







 Our principle sources for medical Empiricism are, as in the case of the 
Methodists, Galen himself as well as the first century BCE Roman author, Celsus, in the 
preface to his De medicina. Besides the references to Empiricism and Empiric doctors 
scattered throughout his corpus, two Galenic treatises survive whose stated subject is the 
Empirical school, De experientia medica and Subfiguratio empirica. Both have been lost 
in Galen's original Greek; Subfiguration empirica is extant only in the peculiar word for 
word translation of Niccolo da Reggio while De experientia medica survives only in its 
Arabic translation, both medieval.41 In addition to these, survives Galen's short treatise 
introductory treatise on the medical sects prominent in his day, De sectis ad eos qui 
introducuntur, in the actual Greek.42    
ORIGINS AND THE ROOTS OF HAIRESEIS 
 
 Beginning with the Peripatetics in the mid 4th century BCE, there is increasing 
evidence for doxographical writing about a variety of intellectual disciplines.43 In one 
                                                
41 Niccolo da Reggio was a 14th century Italian physician whose hyper-literal method of translation was in 
the style of some late 20th century translators of ancient philosophy. Although his Latin is sometimes 
difficult to construe, it so faithfully reproduces its Greek sources that backtranslations to the original from 
his versions are not only possible but have been attempted. 
42 All three works, in translation, are collected in Frede (1985), Three Treatises on The Nature of Science. 
43 A tendency toward doxographical writing can be seen clearly in the prefaces to many of Aristotle's 
works (e.g., De Anim. 1.2, Phys. 1.2, and Meta. A.3-6). Theophrastus and Eudemus author some of the 





sense, the emergence of doxographical writing parallels the emergence and succession 
(διαδοχαί) of heads of schools in the more formal sense, such as the Lyceum and the 
Academy. In the Hellenistic period, however, the Greek world saw a proliferation or, 
more precisely, an articulation of medical and philosophical disciplines into a spectrum 
of schools of thought or sects (haireseis).44 And, it is in the context of (if not as the 
impetus for) this Hellenistic ramification that the Empiricists are generally seen to have 
emerged as a distinct medical movement.45  
 The founder of the Empiricist school is said to have been a student of Herophilus', 
Philinus of Cos (and sometimes his own student Serapion of Alexandria), some time in 
the late 3d century BCE. Sadly, none of Philinus' writing survives. Serapion, when not 
considered the founder as such, is often credited with introducing the empiric "tripod" 
τριποῦς, which made a tripartite division of Empiric heuristic methods into (a) eye-
witness accounts (αὐτοψία), (b) case histories that could when necessary substitute for 
those accounts (ἱστορία), and (c) the most tendentious of Empiric heuristic devices, the 
so-called "transition from a similar case" (μετάβασις ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου), more commonly 
known as transition "to a similar".  
 The generically empirical characteristics of the school, though, have roots in 
medicine as early as the 5th century in Alcmaeon of Croton,46 the Hippocratic treatise, 
                                                
44 See Nutton (1975), Von Staden (1982) 
45 I do not here engage in discussion on what the precise delimitations of ancient medical and philosophical 
haireseis were. For my purposes, it is necessary only to mention when the doxographical record 
distinguishes Empiricists as a distinct and nameable group of medical practitioners and theorists. 
46 Alcmaeon of Croton, for example, is said to have been the first to discover the optic nerve and was a 




On Ancient Medicine (De vetere medicina), and the 4th century rough contemporary of 
Aristotle's Diocles of Carystus. Near the inception of Greek medicine or at least the 
inception of its record, the question of the importance of empirical data to treatment is 
present. Consider the aforementioned Hippocratic treatise VM, where the author 
admonishes the less empirically minded practitioner of medicine, 
Certain doctors and sophists say that it is not possible for someone to 
understand medicine who does not know what a human being is; rather, 
[they say] that it is necessary that the one who is going to treat human 
being correctly understand this [what it is to be a human being]. Their 
argument veers toward philosophy just as Empedocles and the others who, 
from the beginning, have written about nature: what a human being is and 
how he first came to be and how he is structured. But I believe that 
whatever has been said or written about nature by a sophist or a doctor is 
more germane to writing than to the art of medicine. And, I think that that 
there is no way to know anything clear about nature except from medicine. 
And it is possible to understand this when one has correctly grasped the 
whole of the medicine. Prior to this, it seems to me to be missing a lot 
(i.e., this search to know precisely what a human being is and how a 
human being has come about, etc.).47 
                                                                                                                                            
de Sensibus 26 = DK 24A5. For Alcmaeon's concerns about the limit of human understanding see, for 
example, Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 83 = DK 24B1: Alcmaeon of Croton, son of Peirithous, said these things 
to Brontinus, Leon, and Bathyllus, "regarding what is not manifest, the gods have clarity about mortal 
things, but to judge from signs belongs to men" and the following things" (<Ἀλκμαίων Κροτωνιήτης 
τάδε ἔλεξε Πειρίθου υἱὸς Βροτίνωι καὶ Λέοντι καὶ Βαθύλλωι· περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων, περὶ τῶν θνητῶν 
σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι> καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.). Here Alcmaeon contrasts 
the epistemic clarity (σαφήνειαν) of the gods with the inferential constraints placed on mortals 
(τεκμαίρεσθαι). In passing, given my mention of Alcmaeon's anatomical interests, it is worth noting a 
distinction between *empirical* tendencies, which I mean to suggest here, and *Empirical* tendencies, 
which I do not mean to suggest. This concern over the limits of human knowledge runs counter to the 
majority of pre-Socratics (see Longrigg 1993:51) although Cf. Xenophanes' own concerns regarding the 
restrictions of human knowledge.     
47 VM 20.1-13, Λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἰητροὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔνι δυνατὸν ἰητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις 
μὴ οἶδεν ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καταμαθεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς θεραπεύσειν τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους. Τείνει δὲ αὐτέοισιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἳ περὶ 
φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη. 
Ἐγὼ δὲ τουτέων μὲν ὅσα τινὶ εἴρηται σοφιστῇ ἢ ἰητρῷ, ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος, ἧσσον νομίζω τῇ 
ἰητρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ. Νομίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γνῶναί τι σαφὲς οὐδαμόθεν 





Here, the author of VM contrasts two bases for epistemic claims about medicine and the 
natural world. The first set of claims about medicine, is grounded in a general account of 
the natural world without recourse to the experience of practicing physicians. This 
objection to overly theoretical accounts, while only implied at the beginning of the 
passage, is made explicit toward the end, certainly by τοῦτο δὲ, οἷόν τε καταμαθεῖν, 
ὅταν αὐτέην τις τὴν ἰητρικὴν ὀρθῶς πᾶσαν περιλάβῃ. The warrant for the epistemic 
claims of physiologoi, such as Empedocles, contrasts with the warrant by which 
practicing doctors make epistemic claims precisely in the causal relationship between 
theory and experience. These former, sophistical doctors, almost apotropaically distanced 
with the use of the indefinite τίνες, mistakenly base their claims to knowledge on an 
account of the natural world from which they derive medical practice rather than basing 
both their claims to knowledge and their accounts of the natural world on the practice of 
medicine (i.e., that is, I take it, in the experience of the practicing physician).  
 That the appeal to empiricism in VM is unlike later Empiricism is clear in the 
closing lines of the quotation, where the author writes that knowledge of these non-
evident structures may well be possible but only if theories of these sorts are grounded in 
the right sorts of empirical warrant, namely the practice of medicine (for which see both 
the quotation above and the preceding line, νομίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γνῶναί τι σαφὲς 
οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἰητρικῆς.). 
                                                                                                                                            
πᾶσαν περιλάβῃ· μέχρι δὲ τουτέου πολλοῦ μοι δοκέει δεῖν· λέγω δὲ τὴν ἱστορίην ταύτην εἰδέναι 




 In the fourth century, Aristotle and his rough contemporary, Diocles of Carystus 
reveal that the appeal to empiricism in VM was not a flash in the pan.48 I will say more on 
Aristotle's views of empirical data with regard to knowledge claims later but, at present, 
it is worth considering Diocles, who echoes some of the views on explanation also 
present in the Aristotelian account of explanation of first principles in his Posterior 
Analytics. As with most of the other fragmentary medical authors I have and will 
mention, this fragment of Diocles' is preserved in Galen.  
 Galen begins his treatise On the Powers of Foodstuffs (Alim. Fac.) with a brief 
doxography, in the Aristotelian style, of foods and, in particular, the questions of how and 
why certain foods affect the body in different ways. The introduction ranges from a 
compressed discussion of the relative value of deductive explanation to inductive 
explanations and, finally, the question of whether observations or theoretical concerns are 
more important with respect to the effects of food on the body.49 In this context, Galen 
invokes Diocles as a voice in the debate on whether experience or reason should be the 
guide in foods and, by extension, in matters of medical explanation,  
Diocles, even though a Dogmatist, wrote the following in the first book of 
his treatise On Health to Pleistarchus, ... "Those who suppose it is 
necessary in each case to cite the reason why something is nutritious, why 
                                                
48 On Diocles of Carystus, see van der Eijk (2001), which collects all of the known fragments with 
commentary. For Diocles' views, in particular the complicated issue of his dates and the resultant 
relationship of his ideas to Aristotle, see specifically the introductory pgs. xxi-xxxvii. 
49 Alim.Fac. VI 453-4: So, it is reasonable that most of the finest physicians were keen to examine the 
powers of food carefully, some saying that these were known to them from experience alone, others who 
wanted to use reason as well, and even certain others who reckoned that reason was most important of all 
(εἰκότως οὖν ἐσπούδασαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀρίστων ἰατρῶν ἀκριβῶς ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ 
δυνάμεις, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πείρας | μόνης ἐγνῶσθαί σφισι φάσκοντες αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ καὶ λογισμῷ 




it is a laxative, a diuretic, or some other such thing, seem to be unaware: 
first that for practical purposes this sort of thing is frequently unnecessary; 
second, that many things that exist in some respects seem, by their nature, 
like certain first principles, so as not to admit of a causal explanation. 
Additionally, some go wrong when after taking as given things that are 
unknown, not agreed upon, or not credible, they think they have given an 
adequate explanation. While it is not necessary to pay attention to people 
who etiologize in this way or to those who suppose that it is necessary to 
give an explanation for everything, it is necessary rather to rely on things 
that have become known from lengthy experience. And, it is necessary to 
examine the explanation of what admits of one when it is likely that, 
because of this, what is said will become better understood and credible.50 
  
 To readers of Aristotle, Diocles' discussion of first principles as explanatorily 
atomic should be familiar (e.g., Post An. 2 and passim). For Diocles certain things in the 
world, such as food, are like these first principles, ἀρχαί, in that they do not admit of 
causal accounts.51 Medically, this notion that certain principles are explanitorily atomic 
reflects empiricist concerns with respect to how the medical practitioner must engage 
with these otherwise unexplainable items in the world (and later Empiricist concerns that 
these explanations are even possible). For those things that do not admit of an 
explanatory account, the physician should not only resist the urge to provide an etiology 
                                                
50 Alim.Fac. VI 456: <Διοκλῆς> δὲ καίτοι δογματικὸς ὢν οὕτω κατὰ λέξιν ἔγραψεν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ 
τῶν πρὸς Πλείσταρχον Ὑγιεινῶν· αἰτίαν δ' οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου λέγειν, δι' ἣν 
τρόφιμον ἢ διαχωρητικὸν ἢ οὐρητικὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ἀγνοεῖν ἐοίκασι 
πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις οὐ πολλάκις τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἔπειθ' ὅτι πολλὰ τῶν 
ὄντων τρόπον τινὰ ἀρχαῖς τισιν ἔοικε κατὰ φύσιν, ὥστε μὴ παραδέχεσθαι τὸν ὑπὲρ αἰτίου λόγον· 
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διαμαρτάνουσιν ἐνίοτε, ὅταν ἀγνοούμενα καὶ μὴ ὁμολογούμενα καὶ ἀπίθανα 
λαμβάνοντες ἱκανῶς οἴωνται λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν οὕτως αἰτιολογοῦσι καὶ τοῖς πάντων 
οἰομένοις δεῖν λέγειν αἰτίαν οὐ δεῖ προσέχειν, πιστεύειν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πείρας ἐκ πολλοῦ 
χρόνου κατανενοημένοις· αἰτίαν δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων δεῖ ζητεῖν, ὅταν μέλλῃ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
γνωριμώτερον ἢ πιστότερον γίγνεσθαι τὸ λεγόμενον. 
51 For a short discussion both of this passage and of this issue, of Diocles' deeper doubts, relative to 
Aristotle, regarding the possibility of adequate explanations for things in the world, aside from first 




but should disregard those who do; rather, the physician should rely wholly on well-
established experience (πιστεύειν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πείρας ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου 
κατανενοημένοις). Furthermore, for Diocles even when a causal account is possible, it 
is not always desirable, a sentiment which stands as an early indication of a difference 
between expressions of theoretical and practical ends in medicine. 
 These two passages, from the Hippocratic corpus and from Diocles, nearly 
spanning the breadth of the classical period, reveal perhaps unsurprisingly that although 
later Empiricists were in large part reacting to a dominant, primarily theoretical, strand of 
medical practice or exposition throughout the classical period, the questions regarding the 
possibility or improbability of adequately explaining the natural world that ultimately 
drove them to establish themselves as a medical sect had roots that reached far into their 
medical past.   
THE RISE OF MEDICAL SECTARIANISM 
 
   While this passage of Diocles suggests a view of medical epistemology that 
merely places limits on the possibility or practicality of theoretical knowledge in certain 
cases, the earlier account in VM flatly privileged empirical evidence over "accounts" 
λόγοι. This emphasis on empirical data, however, was both not strongly sustained in 
subsequent literature and, although it nodded to part of the Empiricist's program, did not 
fully anticipate sectarian Empiricism. In fact, Von Staden (1982) has argued that the 




contemporaneous with and intimately linked to the birth of the Empiricists as a sect in the 
third century BCE.52 On Von Staden's construal, it is precisely through the example and 
terms set by Serapion in his Ad Sectas that both the Empiricists and the 
Dogmatists/Rationalists take shape as distinct medical haireseis,  
By the end of the pre-Christian era the Alexandrian Empiricists and 
Herophileans therefore had identified themselves or their beliefs- and each 
other- as distinct haireseis and had produced a sizeable corpus of 'hairesis 
literature', the main impetus for which continued to be derived from the 




 This conflict, to which Von Staden points, is ultimately both a methodological 
and epistemological one.54 The Empiricist school, whose core beliefs were more 
homogeneous than the groups of medical practitioners and writers captured under the 
                                                
52 Von Staden (1982: 78), although it is worth keeping in mind, as a point of consideration, the already 
growing doxographic tendencies of Peripatetic authors and the influence of schools whose heads had 
already begun to have successors. It is difficult, though, to make a case either way on the basis of exact 
chronologies, since all these events were occurring nearly contemporaneously in the late 4th and early 3d 
centuries BCE. 
53 Von Staden (1982: 79). Cf. ibid. p. 78, where Von Staden elaborates this point, "[T]he plural haireseis 
[in Serapion's title], probably refers to what later was lumped together as the 'rationalist' or 'dogmatist 
haireseis'. Later Empiricists, perhaps taking their cue from the philosophical Sceptics, labelled all non-
Empiricists 'Rationalists' or 'Dogmatists'; but here the plural perhaps still concedes considerable diversity 
within 'non-Empiricism'- a diversity which later becomes at least partially obscured by the popular but 
distorting and misleading notion of a single 'Rationalist' hairesis. While one cannot exclude the possibility 
that Serapion used hairesis to refer to something other than the distinctive collections of beliefs that 
characterize certain groups, subsequent uses of the term within the Empiricist 'school'- and, for that matter, 
in other medical haireseis- render this unlikely. There were enough groups to provide Serapion with a 
plural target: Herophileans, Erasistrateans, Praxagoras and his pupils, and so on." 
54 This is not to ignore other considerations that set the Dogmatists apart from the Empiricists, for example, 
the tension between the growing interest of the Dogmatists to inquire into the nature (φύσις) of the body, 
health, and illness and of the Empiricists to inquire primarily into what therapies would simply cure the 
illnesses to which the patients were prone. Differences between therapeutic aims are not, however, a main 




more catchall term 'Dogmatist' or 'Rationalist,' took shape in part as a disavowal of two 
long-standing methodological tendencies in Greek philosophy and medicine.55 Without 
lingering on the point, however, this claim should not be taken as excluding all intra-
doctrinal disagreements. As I mentioned earlier, the use of 'transition from the similar' 
(ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου μετάβασις τῷ ὁμοίῳ), for example, was a source of methodological 
contention among Empiricists, on which more shortly. 
 Before the schism of the Empiricists with the Herophileans, one can trace a 
marked tendency among Greek philosophers and physicians generally to (a) posit non-
evident or non-observable explanatory structures (again the Empiricist's ἄδηλα) in the 
natural world, both to and from which one could make inferences and also to (b) privilege 
those inferences over empirical data (or perhaps it is better to say, not to use that 
empirical data as a sine qua non for those inferences).56  
 That is not to say that empirical data were wholly absent from theories 
propounded by philosophers and medical writers before the Empiricists. In fact, many of 
these inferences to so-called hidden explanatory structures in the world took observations 
as their starting point, which is not surprising given the importance of evident signs even 
to indication. Those empirical data, however, were often not an appreciable index of 
verification for the theories they had inspired.57 To that extent, empirical data did not tend 
                                                
55 See Frede (1985), Frede (1990), Nutton (2004) 
56 Cf., Pecc.Dig. V 66; Lib.Prop. XIX 39-40; et passim 
57 See especially Galen's complaints about physicians who ignore available empirical data, as in the 




to play a vital role in the verification of the principles inferred from them. It is in large 
part against these two positions, (a) and (b), that the Empiricists defined themselves.  
 Writing in the first century BCE, the encyclopedist Celsus offers the following 
account both of the emergence of Empiricism and an introduction to some of its 
concerns, 
[T]hose who call themselves Empiricists, paronymously from 
"experience," embrace certain evident causes as necessary. They argue 
that inquiry into truly hidden causes and natural processes is useless on the 
grounds that nature is not intelligible. That nature cannot, in fact, be 
known is patent from the disagreement of those who argue about these 
issues, since on this matter there is no agreement either among the 
professors of philosophy or among physicians themselves. Why indeed 
should someone believe more in Hippocrates than in Herophilus? Why 
more in this guy than in Asclepiades? If someone wants to follow 
doctrines, the doctrines of all of them can seem plausible. If [someone 
wants to follow] treatments, sick people have been brought back to health 
by all of them.58 
  
The Empiricists took shape in opposition to what they perceived as a unifying thread 
running through the epistemological commitments of what could often be an otherwise 
variegated set of medico-philosophical beliefs and methodologies, in the passage above 
ranging from Hippocrates to Herophilus and Asclepiades. Revolting against what they 
saw as an impossible or at least unverifiable interest in so-called hidden causes, 
Empiricists introduced the terms 'Dogmatist' or 'Rationalist' to pick out other practitioners 
                                                
58 Celsus, De Med. 1.27-9, Contra ii, qui se Empiricos ab experientia nominant, euidentes quidem causas ut 
necessarias amplectuntur: obscurarum uero causarum et naturalium actionum quaestionem ideo 
superuacuam esse contendunt, quoniam non comprehensibilis natura sit. Non posse uero comprehendi 
patere ex eorum, qui de his disputarunt, discordia, cum de ista re neque inter sapientiae professores, neque 
inter ipsos medicos conueniat. Cur enim potius aliquis Hippocrati credat quam Herophilo? cur huic potius 
quam Asclepiadi? Si rationes sequi uelit, omnium posse uideri non inprobabiles; si curationes, ab omnibus 




of medicine in virtue of a narrow set of epistemological commitments.59 As a 
consequence, the terms can run the risk of eliding the many differences between the other 
beliefs held by those groups of practitioners.  'Dogmatist' and 'Rationalist' pick out a wide 
range of otherwise heterogeneous schools, while 'Empiricist' or 'Empirical' picks out 
practitioners in virtue of a single, albeit a major difference in commitment to both the 
limits of knowledge and the types of warrant that justify it.  
 Roughly speaking, then, medical Empiricism appears to have arisen as a response 
to a growing dissatisfaction with the proliferation of theories about the natural world, in 
particular theories about the human body and human physiology along with the theories 
on the attendant issues of health and illness. The theorists who held views with regard to 
non-evident or unobservable features of the world, the Empiricists, and the subsequent 
doxographical record, called 'Dogmatists' or 'Rationalists'.  
 The Empiricist's formation as a reaction to this more traditional view in Greek 
medicine (and certainly in Greek philosophy), namely that underlying and hidden 
features of the natural world were more primary than phainomena, is perhaps explanatory 
of their greater internal homogeneity. A version of this view, which I am calling 
traditional, can be encapsulated in Aristotle's common and pithy distinction between what 
is logically prior (and therefore more intelligible in one sense) and what is phenomenally 
prior (and therefore less intelligible although more familiar).60 This distinction takes as its 
point of difference the point of reference. For Aristotle, propositional knowledge about 
                                                
59 On this point, see for example, Tecusan (2004: 7-8) 




the world was more intelligible as such in that it expressed universal truths about the 
natural world, while our experience with particulars, on which this propositional content 
piggybacked, was more accessible prima facie to the observer.  
 I choose Aristotle's view as an example because it is on the whole rather 
congenial to the role that observation or experience (ἐμπειρία) plays in the acquisition of 
knowledge. Yet, it still cleaves to the notion that non-evident structures are the principles 
on which knowledge of the natural world rests. Furthermore, despite the role of 
experience in knowledge acquisition, it is crucial that the knowledge in question (νοῦς 
certainly) is still knowledge of first principles (as opposed to ἐπιστημή that is generally 
knowledge derived from first principles).  
 First principles, in the sense that they are non-evident are, themselves, not directly 
observable through sensation, even if on Aristotle's account they are apprehended 
through νοῦς by way of perception.61 Moreover, although perhaps less objectionable to 
the Empiricist, empirical data on this construal does not supply warrant for knowledge 
claims about those first principles; rather, universals on Aristotle's account are in a sense 
bundled up in perception. They are already bound up in the observer's observation.62 
                                                
61 The issue of ἐπαγωγή in Aristotle is a vexed one. Regardless, the question of whether or not ἐπαγωγή 
is to be taken as 'induction' or something distinct is not directly relevant to my argument, which is just that 
even the Empiricists' more empirically minded predecessors did not eschew knowledge of non-evident 
structures and propositional knowledge of them. For a summation of the controversy and recent 
bibliography see Barnes (1994:259-271).   
62 Experience (ἐμπειρία) explains how one acquires knowledge of first principle but does not clearly serve 
as justification for knowledge of them (see Post.An. 72b19-24, 76a16-37). Rather, it is through retention of 




 At any rate, according to Aristotle, although phainomena are epistemically and 
experientially prior to the underlying (and hidden) structures of the natural world, those 
underlying and hidden structures are logically prior and more knowable than the 
phainomena they undergird.63 Although Aristotle allowed for experience (ἐμπειρία) to 
serve as a springboard toward knowledge of certain universal truths, it was those truths 
toward which one should be directed.64       
 Although Empiricists did differ with regard to the degree to which they admitted 
theoretical entities and forms of formal inference to their medical theories (on this point, 
more shortly), they were united in favor of the notion that, in principle, theoretical 
entities and formal inferences were at best impossible to verify (and so did not offer 
sufficient warrant for knowledge claims) and at worst detrimental to the pursuit of 
medicine. Medical Empiricism was a rejection of this view that phainomena must be in a 
sense posterior to the hidden features of the world underlying them. Since this view, on 
                                                
63 See, for example, PA 640a13-16: It seems that we must first begin, even about generation, just as I said 
earlier that first we must take the phenomena around each kind, then we must talk about their causes 
(Ἔοικε δ' ἐντεῦθεν ἀρκτέον εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι πρῶτον τὰ φαινόμενα 
ληπτέον περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, εἶθ' οὕτω τὰς αἰτίας τούτων λεκτέον καὶ περὶ γενέσεως·). 
64 Cf. PA 1.5: Of those things which are, however many exist by nature [we say that] there are (a) those 
that have neither generation nor destruction at any time and (b) those that are subject to generation and 
destruction. It so happens that about the former, although they are divine and honorable, we have very few 
observations (since the things we can investigate about them and the things we can know about them that 
are apparent to sensation are really very few), while about the latter, those things that are ephemeral (i.e., 
plants and animals) we have plenty of information for our understanding, since we live along side them 
(Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, 
τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας τιμίας οὔσας καὶ θείας 
ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι 
ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἐστιν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν), περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε 




the Empiricist's construal, could not be known it was at best immaterial to medical 
practice. 
  In response to what they saw as a certain theoretical promiscuity, the Empiricists 
jettisoned the causal theories of the Dogmatists from their own approach to medicine and 
adhered, as far as they could, to a practice based solely on observation. They argued that, 
from a therapeutic perspective, the various and varied theories of non-Empiricist 
physicians made little difference to the outcome of medical cases.65 Furthermore, from an 
epistemological perspective, they denied that theories involving appeals to non-evident 
entities could either be verified or known. And, in what appears to have been at root a 
desire to provide for a criterion by which to discount certain theories, they forewent 
etiological theories about the natural world tout court.   
HIDDEN FEATURES OF THE WORLD (ADĒLA) 
 
As mentioned above, a rejection of the intelligibility or at least the diagnostic 
utility of unobservable features of the world (ἄδηλα) is a central if not the central 
concern unifying Empiricist objections to so-called Dogmatist theories of the natural 
world. This rejection of unobservable features has antecedents in much earlier medical 
writing. As early as the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine (De vetere medicina), 
for example, 
                                                
65 Although not an Empiricist, see for example Polybius Hist. 12,25d for suspicion about the efficacy of 




However many have taken a hand to speak or write about medicine, 
having established a hypothesis (ὑπόθεσιν) for their account, either heat 
or cold or wet or dry or whatever else they want, reducing their principle 
of explanation (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίης) for the diseases and death of 
human beings and laying down the same one or two principles in every 
case are clearly wrong in much of what they say. And it is especially 
appropriate to chastise them because they are wrong about a discipline that 
already exists, which everyone uses in the most important circumstances 
and whose good practioners and craftsmen everyone honors.66    
 
PEIRA AND EMPEIRIA 
 
Without appeal to non-evident structures in the world, the Empiricist is at pains to 
justify the choice of one therapeutic plan over another or any therapy at all. They address 
this issue by appealing to medical experience or test in a loose sense (πεῖρα).67 
Experience, for the Empiricists, consisted of two and sometimes three separate heuristic 
tools autopsia (αὐτοψία), historia (ἱστορία), and 'transition from the similar' (ἡ τοῦ 
ὁμοίου μετάβασις). This last tool bears on a point that Galen critically presses 
Empiricists on generally. Given the stress that Empiricists placed on previous direct 
observations and reliable reports of others' direct observations, how was the Empiricist to 
treat cases of illness that were qualitatively different or even significantly different from 
                                                
66 VM 1.1-6: Ὁκόσοι ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἰητρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν σφίσιν αὐτέοισιν 
ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν, ἐς βραχὺ ἄγοντες 
τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίης τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν νούσων τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτέην ἓν ἢ 
δύο προθέμενοι, ἐν πολλοῖσι μὲν καὶ οἷσι λέγουσι καταφανέες εἰσὶν ἁμαρτάνοντες· μάλιστα δὲ 
ἄξιον μέμψασθαι, ὅτι ἀμφὶ τέχνης ἐούσης ᾗ χρέονταί τε πάντες ἐπὶ τοῖσι μεγίστοισι καὶ τιμῶσι 
μάλιστα τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς χειροτέχνας καὶ δημιουργούς. 
67 In this context, experience (πεῖρα), of course, evokes the distinction between experience and technical 
knowledge (τεχνή) made as early as the Classical period by Plato in the Gorgias. On the limits of 




what was recorded in case histories or what formed part of the physicians personal 
experiences? Is the Empiricist not hobbled with respect to the discovery of either 
treatments for previously unknown diseases or of substantially new treatments for old 
ones? Galen, for example, cites the cupping glass as an example of such a discovery in 
On the Affected Parts,  
So that I may say something in response to the Empiricists, it really isn't 
possible to discover any of these sorts of therapies [i.e., ones for rare or 
new diseases] from experience. A man burning up with a very hot fever 
may find relief every once in a while after taking a desperate drink of cold 
water. But, this provides the physician a principle of imitation without any 
rational indication. But the application of the cupping glass did not have a 
chance development, but arose wholly from rational indication; and 
neither could the cupping glass itself ever have come about by chance nor, 
even if someone conceded this point, could it ever have been stuck on 
someone's head by happenstance, especially in the case of a rare illness.68 
 
  
Transition to a similar case from another is the mechanism by which the Empiricist can at 
least attempt to answer Galen's objection regarding new or rare diseases.69 Quite a bit of 
the epistemological difference between the Empiricist and Galen (as well as the 
Dogmatists) rides on how the Empiricist cashes out similarity and analyzes the process 
by which a physician comes to transition from one case to a similar one.  
                                                
68 Loc.Aff. VIII 154-5, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ πείρας, ἵνα τι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπειρικοὺς εἴπω, τῶν τοιούτων 
εὑρῆσθαί τι δύναται· καυσούμενος μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐν πυρετῷ διακαεῖ ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ ὑπ' 
ἀκρασίας προσενεγκάμενος ὤνητο μὲν αὐτός ποτε, μιμήσεως δ' ἀρχὴν ἰατροῖς παρέσχεν ἄνευ 
λογικῆς ἐνδείξεως· ἡ δὲ τῆς σικύας πρόσθεσις οὐδεμίαν ἔχει περίπτωσιν ἡγουμένην, ἀλλ' ἐκ 
λογικῆς ἐνδείξεως ἅπασα γέγονεν, μήτ' αὐτῆς ποτε δυναμένης τῆς σικύας αὐτομάτως γεννηθῆναι 
μήτ', εἰ κᾂν τοῦτό τις συγχωρήσειε, κολληθῆναί ποτε τῇ κεφαλῇ κατὰ περίπτωσιν, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐπὶ 
πάθους σπανίου. 
69 See also Loc.Aff. VIII 371, where Galen reiterates this challenge to the discovery of treatments to rare or 




 This is not to say, however, that Galen considered Empiricists to be ineffective. 
We have already seen how it is that Empiricist therapies could be just as effective as the 
best the Dogmatists had to offer. And, in fact, Galen embraces the Empiricists' common 
complaint about Dogmatist theorizing, namely, that it can lack a basis in observational 
fact. Galen's sympathies with each of these sects cannot be said, though, to extend to the 
Methodists, for whom he reserves nothing but contempt and vitriol.70  
  
                                                
70 On Galen's rhetoric against Methodist doctors, see Nutton (1991: 1-25) and cf. the introduction to 






It has to be said that it is very difficult to determine, with any certainty, what the 
precise epistemological commitments of the Methodists were. It is known that the sect 
was not only very popular in Galen's time but also maintained this popularity for some 
time afterward.71 In fact, Methodism was and continued to be a countervailing school of 
medical practice that rivaled Galenic medicine from its inception through the early 
medieval period, at least in the west.72 The popularity of the sect, however, is belied by 
the paucity of records left by its practitioners.73  
EVIDENCE FOR METHODIST THEORIES OF DISEASE AND THERAPY 
 
Besides Soranus of Ephesus (fl. early-mid 2nd cent. CE) and Caelius Aurelianus 
(fl. 5th cent. CE) no extant treatises by Methodist doctors appear to have survived the 
ravages of history. The vestiges may be even more faded than this, as there is doubt about 
the exact relationship of Caelius' extant treatises Celeres passiones and Tardes passiones 
to Soranus' Acute and Chronic Diseases (περὶ ὀξέων νοσημάτων and περὶ χρονίων 
νοσημάτων). Caelius is generally thought either to be translating or heavily basing his 
                                                
71 See Nutton (2004:188). Galen singles out contemporary Methodists for rebuke such as Statilius Atticus, 
Marcus Modius Asiaticus, Julian, et al. Caelius Aurelianus, whatever his exact dates, is evidence that 
Methodism was still a viable school of medicine as late as the sixth century CE.  
72 Nutton (2004:188) 
73 See Tecusan (2004:1), "Methodist cures became popular, Methodist ideas influential, yet Methodist 
medicine was perceived as a threat to the established tradition. The Methodists achieved fame at the cost of 
an extremely bad press: if they revolutionised medicine, they were certainly silenced by their rivals. For it 




own work on Soranus'.74 Consequently, extant Methodism may very well reduce to one 
author, Soranus, whose opinion is both late and not necessarily representative of the 
school as a whole. 
In addition to the already exiguous nature of extant Methodism, there is a further 
problem with respect to the provenance of the non-Soranic scraps that survive. Although 
recently Tecusan (2004) has collected the surviving testimonia75 about Methodist doctors 
outside Soranus, a problem of the provenance of these testimonia to the Methodists as 
well as any potential fragments persists.76 Her collection shows that the extant testimonia 
and fragments are mostly found in the writing of a single source, Galen, who is 
emphatically not impartial. By her own reckoning, two-thirds of the material on ancient 
Methodism in Tecusan (2004), which is currently the only compendium of its sort, is 
culled from the pages of Galen.77 Since these testimonia are filtered primarily through 
this single lens, points of comparison through which to lessen or at least become more 
clearly aware of the ways in which Galen's interpretation affects Methodist texts are 
difficult at best. Consequently, our view of Methodism is largely Galen's view of 
Methodism. And, given the silence of Methodists themselves, even when other sources 
are available such as Pliny and Celsus, we must rely on those authors whose bias ranges, 
                                                
74 See van der Eijk (1999a: 414-428 and 415-6, n.85) and (1999b: 47-56) 
75 Tecusan, herself, appears to use the word "fragment" in place of the more usual "testimonium". That is, 
her volume is a collection of extant testimonia and perhaps some fragments of the Methodist sect. She is 
explicit in her introduction that her criterion for inclusion in this volume is simply explicit reference to 
Methodism or Methodists, Tecusan (2004: 21-5). 
76 At the time of this report's writing, the second and third volumes of Tecusan's work on Methodist 
fragments have not been published. The second volume is a commentary on the fragments found in the first 
while the third volume will contain the extant fragments of Soranus. 




to varying degrees, from the extremse distaste of Pliny and Galen to the muted 
disapproval of Celsus.78 
  
ORIGINS AND GENEALOGY 
 
As with other things having to do with the Methodists, the origins of the sect are 
as obscure to modern scholars as they were to their ancient counterparts.79 Its roots lie in 
the corpuscular theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia, now reported only through tendentious 
sources and often at multiple removes.80 Generally, Asclepiades is thought to have been 
active some time in the first century BCE, although he is difficult to place precisely.81 For 
our purposes, it is enough to say that he was active some time in the early to mid first 
                                                
78 See Tecusan (2004:1), "[Methodism] looks familiar to us today, but what is known of it makes it 
extremely remote. The sense of familiarity is due to authors like Celsus or Pliny, or above all Galen, who 
was intensely preoccupied with Methodism and mentioned it extremely often. But such authors were 
equally intensely inimical to it, and the positive information to be sifted from their abuse is disappointingly 
meagre." 
79 Tecusan (2004) contains all of the available testimonia to date. See also Pigeaud (1991: 7-50), 
Hankinson (1991: 144-145), Frede (1987b: 1-23), Lloyd (1983: 182-200), and Edelstein (1967: 173-91) 
80 See, e.g., Galen MM X 268-9; 268 for the explicit claim that they are derivative of Asclepiades: Now, 
this is typical of their stupidity, deriving from the theory of Asclepiades, just as the rest of their beliefs do... 
(νυνὶ 
δὲ, τῆς γὰρ τούτων ἐμπληξίας ἐστὶν οἰκεῖον, ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀςκληπιάδου γεγεννημένον ὑποθέσεως, 
ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα αὐτῶν δόγματα...) 
81 There is some confusion regarding Asclepiades' dates. See Nutton (2004: 167). Cicero mentions him in 
De Oratore, the setting of which is in 91 BCE, but not again in his letters. If Asclepiades is already 
established by 91 BCE, it is difficult to follow the succession from Asclepiades to Themison to Thessalus 





century.82 So, one can say that the mid first century is a terminus post quem for the 
beginning of Methodism's story.  
Galen and the surviving mentions of Asclepiades in Methodist authors are in 
agreement that the latter was a source for early Methodism although not its founder.83 
And, even discounting for the reputation that Methodists had for heavily criticizing one 
another and their own intellectual forbears,84 which is consistent with the self-reporting 
that survives of Soranus and Caelius, the Methodists did not see Asclepiades as one of 
their own.85  
Themison (fl. first cent. BCE), allegedly a pupil of Asclepiades, is the first known 
Methodist.86 Celsus already distances Methodism of his own time, the first century CE, 
from the beliefs of Themison.87 An uncomfortably large gap separates Themison from 
Thessalus of Tralles (fl. first cent. CE), whom Celsus does not even mention. Galen 
credits this Thessalus with the foundation of the Methodist school.88 Soranus of Ephesus, 
whose Gynaecia is mentioned above, comes on to the scene some time at the end of the 
first century CE (his death is normally placed in the late 130s CE, a short while after the 
                                                
82 Although, and in vein of disagreements regarding Asclepiades' dates, see Rawson (1982), who argues 
that Asclepiades must have already been dead by the dramatic date of De Oratore, making him active in the 
late second century BCE and perhaps the very early first century.  
83 See, e.g., Galen, Caus.Morb. VII 1-2, 32-33; Plenitudine VII 514-15; SMT XII 783. Caelius Aurelianus 
De morbis acutis 1.155, 2.52, 3.29; De morbis chronicis 1.48, 1.50; see (1990: 131) 
84 What van der Eijk calls a "constant process of critical revision", van der Eijk (1999: 399). For a list of 
contemporary as well as some ancient sources for this claim, see van der Eijk (1999: 398, n. 3) 
85 See, e.g., Soranus Gyn. 3.4, regarding Asclepiades' view on the elements and on causation; Gyn. 3.29, 
regarding Asclepiades' treatment of hysteria, where Soranus approaches Galenic derision of other 
physicians, especially notable are Asclepiades and Hippocrates; Gyn. 3.43 not only on his treatment of flux 
but also on the irrelevance of his diagnostic method. 
86 For Themison, see Moog (1995) and Tecusan (2004) 
87 See Nutton (2004:189) 




birth of Galen). It is only as late as Soranus that enough material survives to get a sense, 
even if a potentially unrepresentative one, of what ancient Methodism may have looked 
like from the inside. 
Since Galen is so monolithic a source for Methodism, it is not clear whether 
Thessalus' approach to medicine was typical of Methodism in general or on its fringes. It 
is necessary to be cautious when even posing the question of what was typical or 
characteristic of Methodist practice and theory, as it is clear that Methodism was not as 
homogenous as Galen might have us believe, although Galen's picture of the Methodists 
in particular is tendentious.89 This caution is underscored by the frequency with which 
Galen, himself, will also point up internal disputes between Methodist writers when it 
suits his rhetorical purposes to do so. In fact, Soranus reviled Asclepiades90 and 
considered Themison,91 who was beside Thessalus another possible candidate for the 
foundation of the sect, to be a closet Asclepiadean by both Soranus and Caelius 
Aurelianus.92 
The picture drawn by Galen and echoed in the anonymous author of Introductio 
seu Medicus claims that Thessalus furthered the doctrines of his own teacher Themison, 
who had himself broken from Asclepiades earlier.93 All of the foregoing is to return to 
                                                
89 See, e.g., Vallance (1990: 132) 
90 See n. 85 
91 Soranus also has sharp words for Themison shortly after voicing his disapproval of Asclepiades at Gyn. 
3.24 and again at 3.42. 
92 De morbis acutis 1.155, 2.232, 3.29; De morbis chronicis 1.48, passim 
93 Int. IV, 684; MM X 52-5. For Asclepiades' influence on and relation to Methodism see Frede (1985: 




this theme of obscurity and emphasize that the doxographical footing surrounding early 
Methodism is historical quicksand.  
EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS 
 
With that caveat already in mind, one must proceed cautiously for a further 
reason. The Methodists appear primarily as bugaboos in Galen's accounts of them. 
Galen's criticisms of them are legion. And so, for this reason too, it becomes more 
difficult to say what their therapeutic practice may have been. In De Sectis, Galen comes 
to his explanation of how the Methodists differ from both the Dogmatist and Empiricist 
sects, 
And the so-called Methodists, for so they named themselves, as though 
their Dogmatist antecedents did not claim to practice the art with any 
method, seem to me not only to disagree with the ancient sects as far as 
their account goes but even so far as to many of the practices of medicine. 
Indeed, they say that the affected part has no relevance to indication of 
treatment (nor the cause, nor age, nor season, nor location, nor an 
examination of the strength, constitution, or disposition of the sick 
person).94  
  
 For Galen, while the Dogmatists and Empiricists differ primarily with regard to 
their epistemological claims, they still prescribe similar treatments. The Methodists not 
only abided by a different understanding of medical knowledge, they also eschewed 
                                                
94 Sect.Int. I 79, Οἱ δὲ μεθοδικοὶ καλούμενοι, οὕτω γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς ὠνόμασαν, ὥσπερ οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν 
ἔμπροσθεν δογματικῶν μεθόδῳ τὴν τέχνην μεταχειρίσασθαι φασκόντων, οὐ μέχρι λόγου μοι 
δοκοῦσι ταῖς παλαιαῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν αἱρέσεσιν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς τέχνης πολλὰ 
μετακοσμεῖν, οἵ γ' οὔτε τόπον πεπονθότα χρήσιμον οὐδὲν ἔχειν φασὶν εἰς θεραπείας ἔνδειξιν οὔτ' 
αἰτίαν οὔθ' ἡλικίαν οὔθ' ὥραν οὔτε χώραν οὔτε τοῦ νοσοῦντος τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἢ τῆς 




effective practice. Of course, this last claim is striking given the popularity of the 
Methodists in the Roman world. When Galen's account is compared to their surviving 
medical texts, however, the Methodists seem far less absurd and far less homogeneous95 
than their Galenic treatment would suggest. This inconsistency argues for a bias on 
Galen's part, since he is equally content to ridicule their internal disagreements as he is to 
point up their failed and, in this context, settled doctrines.96  
THE PLACE OF THE METHODISTS IN THE SECTARIAN DEBATE 
 
The Methodist sect appears to have emerged partly in response to both the 
Dogmatist and Empiricist sects.97 It eschewed the theoretical elaboration of the 
Dogmatists while demanding greater theoretical underpinnings for its medical claims 
than the Empiricists.98 Since Galen, too, attempts to provide a media via between these 
two sects, the Methodists were natural rivals for Galenic medicine.  
Galen, however, restricts his criticisms to their practice and their conception of 
medical epistemology. The specifics of this epistemology are obscure, though, as both 
                                                
95 Even a cursory look through Soranus' Gynaecia or Caelius' Tardes passiones and Celeres passiones 
reveals, through their criticisms of other Methodists, the heterogeneity of Methodist thought regarding 
treatment and classification; that is to say nothing of Galen's pervasive accusations of internal inconsistency 
among Methodists and Celsus' own observations to the same effect in the second and first centuries CE 
respectively. Whether Galen or Celsus are fair witnesses is beside the point. At a minimum they confirm 
the non-doctrinaire tendencies of our extant texts. 
96 Cf., however, Galen's position expressed in MM X 125: Whence, I suppose, arose also the conflict, not 
insignificant, for their [sc. Thessalus, Asclepiades] followers. In every way, they are at loggerheads about 
both about the concept of affections as well as their existence. (ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ πόλεμος οὐ σμικρὸς τοῖς 
ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐγένετο κατά τε ἄλλα πάντα διενεχθεῖσι καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν παθῶν ἐννοίας τε καὶ 
ὑπάρξεως.) 
97 See, e.g., Frede (1982:2) 




Soranus and Caelius remain largely silent on Methodist beliefs regarding medical 
knowledge; that is, they do not attempt to give explicit accounts of their epistemological 
beliefs. Soranus, Caelius, and Methodist critics all allude to general notions of Methodist 
epistemology that, at least in broad strokes, clearly must have played a foundational role 
in their approach to Medical epistemic claims. The so-called commonalities, the 
κοινότητες, the notion of stricture, flux, and the denial both of certain empirical data as 
well as certain theoretical data are common, for example.99  
Their silence is perhaps due to an expectation of familiarity with Methodist 
epistemology on the part of the reader. Although, it is equally if not more plausible that 
Methodist authors, such as Soranus, do not consider the theoretical underpinnings of 
Methodist practice to be terribly important to their readership. In support of this second 
possibility consider, for example, the closing lines to Soranus' Gyn. 1.2, "Since natural 
philosophy (τὸ φυσικόν) is not useful for our ends, although it is a nice bauble for a 
learned work, I have excluded it here, keeping for now only to necessary matters."100 This 
is not to say, however, that these two explanations, an expectation of the reader's 
familiarity with the outlines of the theoretical background of Methodism as well as a lack 
of concern for that theoretical background, are mutually exclusive. 
Of a piece with the relative lack of importance that Soranus places on theoretical 
knowledge, Methodist attitudes toward the fundamentals of medical education focused on 
                                                
99 See, e.g., Celsus De Med. 54-55; Soranus Gyn. 1.29.3 
100 Soranus Gyn. I.2, τὸν μὲν οὖν φυσικὸν ἄχρηστον ὄντα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, φερέκοσμον δὲ πρὸς 




practical matters. If Galen's accounts are any indication, the pupil was not expected to 
undergo a time-consuming curriculum and the Methodists were even reputed to have 
believed that all of medicine could be learned in six months.101 According to Galen, 
Methodists took pride in turning the Hippocratic maxim, ars longa, vita brevis on its 
head,102 
And they rebuke anyone who says, "life is short but the art is long", since 
quite the contrary, "the entire art is short, and life is long". For if 
everything falsely assumed is taken away to help the craft and we put an 
eye to the commonalities (κοινότητας) alone, medicine will no longer be 
long nor difficult but quick and clear; and, the whole business can be 
known in six months.103 
  
With Galen's emphasis on the proper and extensive education104 necessary for 
medical competence, this emphasis on practicality alone did and must have galled him.105 
The Methodist sect was bound to offend Galen's sensibilities both as a champion of 
philosophical medicine and as an agitator for the conversion of medicine at Rome to an 
elite practice, both points that Frede (1982) makes in passing, 
Methodism had a great success in Rome. Nevertheless, the aggressive way 
it was propounded by Thessalus could not but offend the more 
                                                
101 See Dig.Puls. VIII 770, MM X 781, 927  
102 On parallels between Methodists avowal of shortcuts to medicine and similar philosophical stance (i.e., 
Cynics) see Barnes (1991: 60 n. 37) 
103 Sect.Int. 82.29-83: καὶ τῷ γε βραχὺν [εἶναι] εἰπόντι τὸν βίον, τὴν δὲ τέχνην μακρὰν ἐπιτιμῶσι· 
τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἅπαν αὐτὴν μὲν βραχεῖαν εἶναι, τὸν δὲ βίον μακρόν. Ἀφαιρεθέντων γὰρ ἁπάντων 
τῶν ψευδῶς ῾θπειλημμέννων τὴν τέχνην ὠφελεῖν καὶ πρὸς μόνας τὰς κοινότητας ἀποβλεπόντων 
ἡμῶν, οὔτε μακρὰν ἔτι τὴν ἰατρικὴν ο῎θτε χαλεπὴν εἶναι, ῥᾴστην δὲ καὶ σαφὴ, καὶ μησὶν ἓξ ὅλην 
[τάχιστα] γνωσθῆναι δυναμένην.  
104 For Galen's insistence on lengthy and rigorous study, see, e.g., Opt.Med. I 59; CAM I 244; Nat.Fac. II 
179-80; PHP V 222, 732-3, 783; MM X 39-40; Pecc.Dig. V 61-83; et passim. 
105 Consider also that Galen frequently places himself, in Aristotelian style, at the head of a long tradition 
in medicine hearkening back to Hippocrates himself. Given the Methodists lack of interest in traditional 




traditionally minded doctors. When Hippocrates had said that life is short 
and art long, Thessalus claimed that life was long and art short, a matter of 
six months. This was a deliberate affront not only to all those who 
venerated Hippocrates but also to all those who, like Galen, prided 
themselves on their long and no doubt expensive medical training. It 
seems fairly clear that Methodism was also felt and presumably meant to 
be a social threat: a clear medical doctrine to be learned in six months, 
even by slaves and the poor, who had not the education to master the 
secrets of philosophy, mathematics, and the whole of learned medical 
tradition going all the way back to Hippocrates.106 
 
 
Galen's outrage and his need to persuade his readership that his attitude toward 
medicine was far and away superior to the Methodist attitude, however, plays both a 
central role in the preservation of Methodism in his corpus (or at least a version of it) and 
what appear to be the massive distortions this image of Methodism appear to have 
suffered at his hands.   
It is necessary, then, to tease out what is possible from Galen's reports as well as 
from what few fragments remain. To that end, I turn to the roots of what we are told 
Methodism is, which begin with Asclepiades of Bithynia.  
METHODIST FORERUNNERS, ASCLEPIADES AND CORPUSCULAR THEORISTS 
 
At the root of the Methodist approach to medicine is a corpuscular theory of 
disease derived ultimately from Asclepiades of Bithynia. Asclepiades appears to have 
believed that the body consisted of certain particles (ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι), whose nature is 
                                                




itself a matter of some controversy,107 as well as pores (πόροι).108 To be healthy, on his 
account, was just to have free movement of these particles through corporal pores; illness 
was a result of pores being overly constricted or overly loose and therefore affecting the 
movement of these particles adversely. Since the cause of illness was the relative stricture 
of the pores, working to counteract any imbalance in the pores relative to the size of the 
corresponding particles was a necessary and sufficient condition for restoring the body to 
health.  
Asclepiades' corpuscular theory was itself reminiscent of other ancient theorists 
who believed in variations on this particular theme: Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus 
all spring to mind. Given the present work's scope, however, it is impossible to do more 
than briefly mention earlier corpuscular theorists as a background for some other 
conflicts Galen was fated to have with the Methodists. In particular, atomism was 
associated with a non-teleological view of the world.109  
Additionally, a corpuscular theory occupied the same functional role in 
physiology as the traditional Hippocratic humoral theory. That is, both a corpuscular 
view and a humoral view see health through the lens of some kind of biological balance, 
                                                
107 Briefly, it is not clear what ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι means precisely. They were frangible and so unlike the 
eponymous ἄτομα of the atomists, precisely in the respect most characteristic of them. Consequently, 
Asclepiades' ὄγκοι cannot be taken to be quantitatively atomic even if they are in some way qualitatively 
atomic. Regarding ἄναρμοι, Vallance gives a host of philological reasons for interpreting the adjective as 
meaning something breakable or in a sense 'disjointed,' into fragments such as θαύσματα for example (see 
Vallance (1990: 40-42).   
108 For a longer discussion of the nature of Asclepiadian particles, ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, and the difficulty in 
determining what precisely they were thought to be, see Vallance (1990): 7-43. 
109 See, e.g., Diogenes Laertius 9.31= DK 67A1; Hippolytus Ref. 1.13.2= DK 68A40; Simplicius De Caelo 




on the humoral view a balance whose equilibrium when thrown off-kilter accounts for 
illness in the body and on the corpuscular view, a balance between stricture and the 
relative size of the corpuscles passing through them account for the same thing.110  
This bare bones account of Asclepiades' theory is intended both to flesh out some 
of the details of the physiology that Methodists would later commit themselves to as well 
as to prompt a question: assuming the Methodist's lack of interest in theoretical issues, 
causation, and commitment issues with unseen biological processes (ἄδηλα), how could 
Methodists use Asclepiades' corpuscular theory as a starting-point for their own views? 
WHAT CAN BE SAID OF METHODIST MEDICAL BELIEFS 
 
The core beliefs that appear consistently both in what survives of Methodist 
authors and even in non-Methodists commenting on them are two: first, the notion that 
diseases in general shared a certain very limited set of features, whose treatment was 
sufficient to cure the patient of his illness.111 Second, these limited sets of features were 
classed into three rough categories that took their contours from differing relations 
between pores (ποροί) and the corpuscles passing through them, arising from some kind 
of corpuscular theory, likely a version of Asclepiades'.112  
                                                
110 See Vallance (1990:10). On this point, it is not necessary for my purposes, to discuss most of the 
particular differences between Asclepiades' corpuscles and Abderite atoms in too much detail (e.g., 
frangibility and indivisibility respectively). It is only necessary to show that, at its deepest root, Methodism 
was anathema to Galen. 
111 See Vallance (1990: 132)  
112 An objection that Galen brings to bear often against the Methodists is the paradigmatic status of pores 
as instances of non-evident (ἄδηλα) features of the world. Their pedigree was indeed old, and is found as 




The Methodists called these classes of shared features κοινότητες, often 
translated 'commonalities' or 'communities'; these commonalities were divided into three 
types, running along an axis of relative constriction and taking their structure from a 
corpuscular analysis of the body: stricture (στέγνωσις), looseness or flux (ῥοῶδες or 
ῥύσις), and a third state (ἐπιπλοκή) compounded of the first two states occurring 
variously in the body.113 
These corpuscles, pores, and consequently those states that are relations between 
them present a stumbling block for reconstructing a coherent Methodist epistemology. 
Both corpuscles and pores are paradigm cases of non-evident entities, ἄδηλα, to which 
Methodists are in principle opposed. Sextus Empiricus, to take an example, includes 
pores in his list of stereotypically un-experiencable entities in Adversus Mathematicos,114 
"Naturally non-evident entities are those which are always hidden and unable to fall 
under our perception, as for example the intelligible pores and the infinite void thought to 
be outside the cosmos by certain physical theorists."115 What then would a Methodist 
respond to objections that the two bases of their physiology conflict with the 
epistemological demands they place on medical theory? 
                                                                                                                                            
short of either claiming that they were only heuristically committed to something like pores and not 
ontologically committed to them or claiming that pores were somehow evident to sensation.  
113 See Celsus De med. 1.54-5; Soranus Gyn. 1.29.3 
114 Pores are part of a larger discussion in Sextus on intelligible entities and the signs by which non-
sceptical thinkers, such as the dogmatists, explain inference from those signs. See, Math. 8.145-158. Also, 
PH 2.98, 140. For the larger issue of non-evident entities and indication through sign, see Hankinson 
(1998: 232-233). 
115 Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.146: φύσει δὲ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ δἰ αἰῶνος ἄποκεκρυμμένα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενα 
ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πεσεῖν ἐνάργειαν, καθάπερ οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι καὶ τὸ ἀξιούμενον ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ 




There are no extant sources that contain an explanation or justification for these 
states of relative constriction, which is perhaps due to the inclination among Methodists 
to avoid any professional affiliation with robustly articulated medical theories even if 
privately cleaving to a more elaborated theory. It was enough to recognize an imbalance 
with respect to constriction. That is, for the Methodists, the proof was in the pudding. 
Any further explanation, as Vallance notes, lay outside the purview of what was relevant 
to medical practice, which was after all the ambit of medicine.116  
It is likely, however, that relative constriction played the role in Methodist view 
of illness due to the connection, mentioned earlier, with the corpuscular theory of 
Asclepiades and, if Galen is to be trusted, Epicureans, and other corpuscular theorists; 117 
but, given Galen's efforts to equate Methodists with Epicureans it is difficult to say what 
the exact relationship may have been. 
On that point, Vallance has argued that the connection between the particles of the 
Methodists, inofar as they were those of their predecessor Asclepiades, and Epicurean 
atoms is passing or, more likely, adventitious.118 That is, while both Asclepiades and 
atomists were material monists, in that they believed that bodies were made up of a single 
kind of stuff, Asclepiades was not committed (and could not be) to the further constraints 
                                                
116 Vallance (1990: 132) 
117 Cf. Nat.Fac. II 38-56 and especially 51-52 for a comparison of Epicureans and Asclepiadeans, in which 
Galen argues that the two sects reject one another effectively. In particular, that Epicureans state the 
observable facts well but cannot give any reasons for the theories they derive from them, while 
Asclepiadeans (although Asclepiades has effectively shown the inconsistencies in Epicurus' overall 
corpuscular theory) fail either to present a plausible theoretical picture or account for the facts. 




that Epicureans and Democriteans placed on the structure of their underlying stuffs, 
namely indivisibility. 
In that vein, Vallance emphasizes the frangibility of Asclepiades' ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι 
as distinct from the indivisible particles that populate Epicurean and Abderite accounts of 
material composition. One crucial difference between Asclepiades' particles and those of 
atomic theorists is a consequence of this frangibility. While Epicurean and Abderite 
atoms were of some constant dimensions, Asclepiadean corpuscles could result in disease 
precisely due to an alteration in their shape and size and not, for example, just in virtue of 
their shape and size.  
This etiology is, of course, compatible with but not necessary for Methodist 
beliefs regarding the so-called communities. How relative constriction could come about 
is a question over and above the notion both that relative constriction is just a matter of 
fact and that this constriction results in illness. Galen, however, does not engage directly 
with constriction, arguably as a means to dismiss the Methodists, whom he does not as a 
group take seriously. Vallance also claims that this distinction is elided by Galen in order 
to associate Methodists with atomism and by so doing make a caricature of their view of 
the body's composition, 
Galen was no fool. He must have known that Democritean and Epicurean 
atomism differed profoundly from Asclepiades' corpuscular hypothesis. 
After all, he was aware of the fragility of the particles. And in his note at 
De elementis 1.418k he makes it quite clear that he knows that the 




'indivisible on account of their size'. He is just as clear about the 
Asclepiadean corpuscles.119 
 
Vallance suggests that Galen makes medical simpletons out of the Methodists for 
rhetorical purposes.120 And, although it is difficult to reconcile the Methodist disavowal 
of hidden causes with their commitment to the communities and the corpuscular theory 
underlying them, it is clear from observations like Vallance's above that Galen is playing 
fast and loose with his rivals. Comparisons Galen's accounts of Methodist incompetence 
and what little survives in writing of Methodist practice, by Methodist authors such as 
Soranus and Caelius, reaffirm this notion.  
Soranus' dictum at Gynecologia I.2, already quoted,121 may also explain why the 
Methodists might remain silent on their own theoretical commitments, however loosely 
those were taken. Furthermore, their nearly institutionalized tendency toward intra-
sectarian criticism can give the impression of inconsistency, where there may simply 
have been therapeutic debate. Vallance sums up this point nicely,  
Methodism was not a homogeneous system, and our first-hand knowledge 
of it does not extend very far beyond what we can see in Caelius and 
Soranus. The method of the Methodists was essentially a method of 
treatment, and while all Methodists seemed to have shunned theoretical 
speculation, they did so to varying degrees.122  
 
                                                
119 Vallance (1990: 40) 
120 A point brought out throughout the introduction to Tecusan (2004) 
121 "Since natural philosophy (τὸ φυσικόν) is not useful for our ends, although it is a nice bauble for a 
learned work, I have excluded it here, keeping for now only to necessary matters." Soranus Gyn. I.2, τὸν 
μὲν οὖν φυσικὸν ἄχρηστον ὄντα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, φερέκοσμον δὲ πρὸς χρηστομάθειαν, κεχωρίκαμεν 
ἐντεῦθεν, μόνον πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐχόμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. 




Consequently, a formal nosology was not necessary on a Methodist contrual even 
if a therapeutic one was. What use, after all, was a classification of diseases when 
nosological differentia were not causally relevant to treatment? The same can be said for 
an elaborate taxonomy of symptoms. Except insofar as they might be indicative of a 
strictural imbalance in the pores of the body relative to the corpuscles passing through 
them, symptoms bore little medically relevant relation to the underlying cause of the 
disease. Consider, for example, Soranus' discussion of inflammation of the uterus, 
Inflammation is so-called on account of "growing inflamed" and not as 
<Democritus> has said, on account of the cause being phlegm. There are 
many other antecedent causes of inflammation around the uterus but very 
frequently they are cold, likewise pain, miscarriage, and a poor delivery, 
none of which contributes to a change of treatment. When the uterus is 
inflamed, some general signs appear and some particular and indicative of 
its affected part.123 
 
Here, Soranus echoes his claim from elsewhere in the Gynecologia that the causes 
of a given disease are not relevant to its treatment, even if they are of interest to the 
curious practitioner. The notion at work in this passage is that physical disorders will fall 
into three broad categories. The affected part will be overly constricted, not sufficiently 
constricted, or there will be a mix of disordered constriction. Ultimately, the reasons for 
the disordered constriction are not relevant to treatment; so, the physician need only be 
concerned with correctly identifying which of the three abnormal constrictions presents 
                                                
123 Soranus Gyn. 3.17, Ἡ φλεγμονὴ κέκληται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ φλέγειν καὶ οὐχ ὡς ὁ <Δημόκριτος> 
εἴρηκεν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ φλέγμα. προκατάρχει δὲ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὑστέραν φλεγμονῆς πολλὰ 
μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, συνεχέστερον δὲ ψύξις, ὡσαύτως κόπος, ἔκτρωσις φαύλη τε μαίωσις, ὧν οὐδὲν εἰς 
τὴν ἐξαλλαγὴν συντελεῖ τῆς ἐπιμελείας. μήτρας δὲ φλεγμαινούσης τὰ μὲν κοινὰ παρέπεται σημεῖα, 




itself.124 Galen variously takes this Methodist uninterest in causal explanations as a deep 
methodological inadequacy. He says, for example, that  
[t]o suppose that health exists in function and that disease consists in 
physical conditions or, alternately, that health is in the constitution of the 
parts while disease is in the injury of functions is worthy of the other 
Methodists, and especially of Thessalus, the founder (ἀρχηγοῦ) of their 
idiocy. In fact, nearly all these members of this non-methodical and insane 
sect say that health, and heartiness, is the stability of natural functions, 
while disease, and frailty, is not injury of functions but as far as some go a 




Galen's view of the importance of a causal account in the understanding and 
therefore the treatment of disease brings us to the role that causation played for 
Galen, in opposition to Methodist and Empiricist approaches to therapy. 
 
  
                                                
124 This sentiment is echoed shortly after the passage above at the end of 3.19, on Demetrius of Apamea's 
analysis of the spread of inflammation, "and we agree on this point, even if what is being sought out makes 
no difference to the application of local treatment" (καὶ <ἡμεῖς> δὲ τοῦτο συναινοῦμεν, εἰ καὶ τὸ 
ζητούμενον οὐδεμίαν ἐξαλλαγὴν ἐπιφέρει πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν τοπικῶν βοηθημάτων). 
125 MM X 51: τὸ δ᾽ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὑποθέμενον εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν, ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεσιν 
ὑπολαμβανεῖν συνίστασθαι τὴν νόσον, ἢ ἔμπαλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν μορίων τὴν ὑγιείαν, ἐν 
δὲ τῇ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὴν νόσον, ἄξιον τῶν τε ἄλλων μεθοδικῶν ἐστι καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ τῆς 
ἐμπληξίας αὐτῶν ἀρχηγοῦ Θεσσαλοῦ. πάντες γοῦν σχεδὸν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμεθόδου τε καὶ 
μανιμώδους ταύτης αἱρέσεως τὴν μὲν ὑγείαν εὐστάθειαν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργεῖων εἶναί φασι και 
ἰσχύν, τὴν δὲ νόσον οὐκ ἔτι βλάβην ἐνεργείας καὶ ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλ᾽οἱ μὲν διάθεσίν τινα σώματος, οἱ 







Galen was born to a wealthy family at Pergamum in 129 CE. His father, Nicon, 
was a successful architect who undertook to have his son educated in philosophy from an 
early age.126 As was fairly standard for the children of the socially elite, Galen was 
trained in grammar and mathematics; he began to study logic at the age of fourteen and 
was educated by prominent philosophers of the major philosophical schools of the time 
starting at the age of fifteen.127 His so-called eclecticism reflects his early exposure to this 
philosophical melange, which included study under Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, and 
Epicureans.128 Some time around between the ages of fourteen and seventeen, Nicon is 
reputed to have had a dream in which Asclepius appeared to him encouraging that he 
train his son in medicine, in addition to his training in philosophy.129 As with philosophy, 
Galen studied under representatives of the medical sects of the day, first at Pergamum 
and then after the death of his father in 149 CE, throughout the Greco-Roman world.130 
This early training that Galen received in philosophy instilled in him a deep 
respect for and adherence to logical method in his medical practice, with certain caveats. 
                                                
126 See Hankinson (2008: 3-4) for a longer discussion of Galen's early education. For standards of 
education in the Roman period Cf., for example, OCD s.v. 'education, Roman.' Children of social elites 
generally were educated by a grammaticus, who would have trained students in letters as well as 
mathematics, through about the age of twelve and then a rhetor through about the age of fifteen.    
127 Ord.Lib.Prop. XIX 59 
128 Cf. Aff.Dig. V 41-2. Also, see Hankinson (2008: 3).  
129 See Praen. XIV 608; Ord.Lib.Prop. XIX 59 





By the second century CE, various philosophical sects (e.g., the Stoics and Peripatetics) 
had come to disagree with respect to logical method in similarly sectarian ways to those 
in which the various medical schools had come to disagree, regarding the role of formal 
inference in the practice of medicine. While the Peripatetics focused primarily on types of 
logical quantification (e.g, universal, existential), the Stoics focused primarily on 
connectives (e.g, the conditional, disjunctions, etc.).131 
 
APPROACH TO MEDICINE 
 
As mentioned earlier, Galen's approach to medicine was shaped by his early 
experiences with philosophical logic. These experiences, however, had left him, as he 
tells us, dissatisfied both with the inter-sectarian discord and with the inability of 
logicians to adequately verify the claims they alleged to prove, 
So, after entrusting myself to all of the leading Stoic and Peripatetic 
philosophers of the time, I learned many logical theorems which, once I 
had examined them for a time, I found to be useless for demonstrations 
(ἀποδείξεις): very few had been investigated, by the Stoics and 
Peripatetics, with any practical result (χρησίμως) and very few would 
allow them to reach their stated demonstrandum. Moreover, these 
theorems were inconsonant (διαπεφωνημένα) with one another and some 
even contradicted our native intuitions. For all that's holy, if it were up to 
these teachers, I would have fallen into Pyrrhonian aporia had I not 
mastered geometry, arithmetic, and logic, in which subjects most of all I 
                                                





had been taught to proceed from childhood by my father, who had learned 
theory from my grandfather and great-grandfather. 132  
 
 
Galen's complaint regarding the inconsistencies (διαφωνίαι) between the logical 
theories of the Stoics and Peripatetics echoes some of the grounds for the Empiricists' 
rejection of Dogmatist sects (see, for example, De Sectis I 78-79, quoted earlier), where 
Galen puts a very similar argument into the mouths of Empiricists who reject Dogmatism 
for just these reasons.  In that passage, the conclusions that the medical Dogmatists come 
to, like the arguments of the Stoics and Peripatetics here, are plausible but neither proven 
nor provable (at least not employing their method of argument).133  
Galen's central objection to arguments between Dogmatists, here, is that they did 
not have a basis for adjudicating between different accounts for their treatments and 
analyses of the natural world.134 His response to the argumentative inadequacies he 
                                                
132 Lib.Prop. XIX 39-40, πᾶσιν οὖν τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐνδόξοις Στωϊκοῖς τε καὶ 
Περιπατητικοῖς ἐμαυτὸν ἐγχειρίσας πολλὰ μὲν ἔμαθον ἄλλα τῶν λογικῶν θεωρημάτων, ἃ τῷ μετὰ 
ταῦτα χρόνῳ σκοπούμενος ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς ἀποδείξεις εὗρον, ὀλίγιστα δὲ χρησίμως μὲν αὐτοῖς 
ἐζητημένα καὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκοποῦ τυχεῖν ἐφιέμενα, διαπεφωνημένα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρ' 
αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις, ἔνια δὲ καὶ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐννοίαις ἐναντία, καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς 
διδασκάλοις, εἰς τὴν τῶν Πυρρωνείων ἀπορίαν ἐνεπεπτώκειν ἂν καὶ αὐτός, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ κατὰ 
γεωμετρίαν ἀριθμητικήν τε καὶ λογιστικὴν κατεῖχον, ἐν αἷς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ 
παιδευόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς προεληλύθειν ἀπὸ πάππου τε καὶ προπάππου διαδεδεγμένῳ τὴν θεωρίαν. 
133 In Galen, forms of διαφωνία and διαφωνεῖν often refer to sectarian disagreements. For similar 
language with respect to sectarian διαφωνία as a motive for Galen's different approach to demonstration 
see MM X 469, "As I have already said in my treatise On Demonstration, after I had been completely 
buried under the discord (διαφωνία) between most doctors, I turned to evaluating demonstration (αὐτήν), 
knowing that it was necessary first to be well-versed in the demonstrative method. Having done this for 
many consecutive years, I subjected each of the doctrines to demonstration in a similar way." (Ὡς γὰρ κᾀν 
τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς εὑρέσεως εἴρηται γράμματι, περιαντληθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῆς τῶν 
ἰατρῶν διαφωνίας, εἶτ' ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν αὐτὴν τραπόμενος, ἔγνων χρῆναι πρότερον ἐν ἀποδεικτικαῖς 
μεθόδοις γυμνάσασθαι. καὶ τοῦτο πράξας ἔτεσιν ἐφεξῆς πολλοῖς ὑπέβαλλον οὕτως ἕκαστον τῶν 
δογμάτων αὐτῇ...). For Galen's use more generally, Cf. Sect.Int. I 78; MM X 35, 53, 469 et passim. 
134 Although this objection has as its target competent logicians, Galen also frequently objects to logical 




perceives in some of the theorems of the Stoics and Peripatetics is, to a point, similar to 
the Empiricist response to the proliferation of medical theories without some, in their 
case empirical, litmus test for truth. Galen makes this point more explicit immediately 
after the quotation above where he offers up a type of geometric proof based on empirical 
evidence as a basis for just this sort of adjudication, 
Seeing, therefore, that evident truths (manifest not only to me) were 
produced in the predictions of eclipses, in the construction of sundials and 
of water-clocks, and of many other things besides in engineering, I 
thought it would be better to use this type of geometrical demonstration.135 
 
 
All of the examples above, the sundial, waterclock, and cases of engineering, have 
in common that their function is demonstrable through repeated physical observation.136 
Galen is certainly no sceptic with regard to the senses and it is perhaps useful, in this 
context, to recall the root meaning of geometry (γεωμετρία). Geometry was originally, 
as the structure of the word suggests, a form of land surveyance.137 That is, geometrical 
                                                                                                                                            
This sort of complaint is common in Galen's writing, that not only is the theory held by the object of his 
attack flawed but also that the target in question fails to understand even this flawed theory (e.g., MM X 38, 
61-2; PHP V 220; and, emphatically passim). 
135 Lib.Prop. XIX 40, ὁρῶν οὖν οὐ μόνον ἐναργῶς ἀληθῆ φαινόμενά μοι τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐκλείψεων 
προρρήσεις ὡρολογίων τε καὶ κλεψυδρῶν κατασκευὰς ὅσα τ' ἄλλα [τὰ] κατὰ τὴν ἀρχιτεκτονίαν 
ἐπινενόηται βέλτιον ᾠήθην εἶναι τῷ τύπῳ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀποδείξεων χρῆσθαι· 
136 See Pecc.Dig. V 82-83, too lengthy to quote here, for the observational tests Galen recommends for the 
construction of an accurate sundial. In brief, one creates a sort of waterclock by which to measure the 
sundial: after a stipulated period of time determined by whatever standard measurement the sundial 
measures, one observes how much water has leaked from a pierced vessel. After marking the side of the 
vessel and refilling it, one waits for another unit of that time to pass as measured by the sundial. If after 
repeated tests of this sort the waterclock and sundial agree, the sundial is accurate. Of particular relevance, 
here, is Galen's emphasis on repetition the deciding factor of the empirical proof and repeatability as the 
criterion for success for the sundial (and by extension for medicine). 
137 The earliest attestation of γεωμετρία, for example, is in Herodotus 2.109, in a discussion of Egyptian 
land surveyance. The sundial and the division of the day into hours also appear in this passage, 




demonstration, on this construal, is a tool for measuring and quantifying natural 
phenomena, whose utility was in large part determined by its ability to accurately and 
repeatedly predict features of the natural world, to function in practice.  
Even in its later use, to refer to its eponymous branch of mathematics and the 
forms of proof found therein, Euclidian geometry was based on certain axioms and 
common notions that were either supposed to be immediately evident to the senses or 
immediately evident to the mind. This notion, of immediate evidence to the mind, 
requires some unpacking.  Consequently, It may be organizationally useful here to 
discuss Galen's logical method generally, in order to explain the role that these so-called 
geometrical demonstrations and geometric axioms play in his overall medical method.138 
LOGICAL METHOD 
 
Inquiry regarding the discord (διαφωνίας) between practitioners is of 
great import, not only for those who are ill to regain their health but also 
for those who are healthy (clearly as a protector of it) and for those who 
exercise for good health in order to get it and keep it. Then he added, "and 
for whatever each person wants," making it clear to us that the problem 
and its solution extend not only to medicine but also to all the other arts 
(τέχνας).  
The reason why doctors, practicing an art in which it is possible to tested 
by experience (τῇ πείρᾳ... κριθῆναι) whether the remedies used helped or 
hurt, still make contradictory claims about what helps and what hurts may 
be baffling. It is not at all baffling that, in philosophy, the majority of 
                                                                                                                                            
this primary meaning of geometry even in later Greek (Cf. PTeb. 24.42, POxy. 499.27 from the second 
centuries BCE and CE respectively). 
138 Cf. Pecc.Dig. V 66, on the need to verify theories both on the basis of indemonstrable but evident first 




disagreements (τῶν διαφωνιῶν) haven't at all been settled, since its 
subject matter cannot clearly be tested by experience (τῇ πείρᾳ).139   
 
 
Engineering, waterclocks, and sundials, whose successful functions are 
determined observationally, all point to a useful subset of the sorts of premises that Galen 
accepts as contributing to the soundness of arguments. That is, their proof is in the 
pudding.140 In this vein, Galen's writing is replete with evidence that he is primarily 
interested far less in the validity of argument, as he suggests of some Dogmatists and 
sophistical doctors, than in their soundness.141 He consistently shows that he is primarily 
interested in arguments ranging over and proceeding from features of the world that are 
able to be judged by experience (τῇ πείρᾳ). Experience, for Galen, not only involves 
features of the world that are evident to sensation but also features that are evident to 
cognition, in the way that geometric axioms and common notions can be said to be 
evident (more on this latter notion, which is one of the features that distinguishes Galen 
from Empiricists, shortly).142   
                                                
139 PHP V 765-6, τὸ περὶ τῆς διαφωνίας, φησί, τῶν τεχνιτῶν σκέμμα μεγίστην ἔχει δύναμιν οὐ 
μόνοις τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἐς ὑγιείας κτῆσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν, ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῆς δηλονότι, 
καὶ τοῖς ἀσκοῦσιν ἐς εὐεξίην τοῦ σώματος πρός τε τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς καὶ διαμονήν· εἶτα προσέθηκε 
“καὶ ἐς ὅ τι ἕκαστος ἐθέλει,” δηλῶν ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον εἰς ἰατρικὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας 
ἐκτετάσθαι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὴν λύσιν αὐτοῦ. θαυμάσαι γάρ ἐστι διὰ τί τέχνην μετιόντες οἱ ἰητροὶ 
καθ' ἣν τῇ πείρᾳ τὰ προσφερόμενα βοηθήματα κριθῆναι δύναται, πότερον ὠφέλησεν ἢ ἔβλαψεν, 
ὅμως ἐναντιωτάτας ἀποφάσεις ἐποιήσαντο περὶ τῶν ὠφελούντων τε καὶ βλαπτόντων.  ἐν μὲν γὰρ 
φιλοσοφίᾳ μὴ πεπαῦσθαι τὰς πλείστας τῶν διαφωνιῶν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, ὡς ἂν μὴ δυναμένων 
τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναργῶς κριθῆναι τῇ πείρᾳ 
140 Cf., Pecc.Dig. V 69, where Galen describes how one tests sundials, waterclocks, and other mechanical 
devices against astronomical observations. 
141 Cf. Pecc.Dig. V 72-3 on the perils of valid but unsound arguments (among other types of arguments).  




Galen, for example, as suggested by the quotation above shows a conspicuous and 
explicit lack of interest in many of the questions that frequently peppered philosophical 
and medical texts preceding him. He variously denigrates any conclusions regarding 
void, the sempiternity of the world, the corporeality or location of divine entities, the 
nature of the soul, the faculty involved in the formation of the fetus, etc., as not 
adequately verifiable and therefore largely pointless from a medical perspective.143 
EVIDENCE 
 
Let me return now to the geometric example I mentioned earlier. I had said that 
Euclidean geometry took as its axioms notions that were either evident to sensation or in 
a sense evident to the mind and that Galen's repeated use of geometric proof was telling 
for his own medico-philosophical practice. Galen mentions geometric proofs as a 
palliative for his disgust with the proliferation of Dogmatist theories and as the means by 
which he tried to forge a new path in medicine. Given Galen's interest in finding the 
proper warrant for the premises of medical arguments, it bears some fruit to discuss the 
basis for geometric principles, at least of the ancient sort. 
 
 
                                                
143 See passim but e.g., Prop. Plac. 2; PHP V 771 on the generation or destruction of the world, on void, 
on the corporeality and location of divine beings. Prop. Plac. 3 and 7; PHP V 763, 766 on the substance of 
the soul. Prop.Plac. 4, on knowledge of celestial bodies. Prop.Plac. 11; Foet.Form. IV 700-2 on the 




a) Empirical Evidence 
 
It is not fair to say that Galen considered empirical evidence to be the only 
satisfactory warrant for knowledge claims, although empirical warrant was sufficient for 
such claims. Beginning with empirical evidence, however, it is fair to say that Galen was 
not a sceptic with respect to perception.144 In this respect and others, Galen was fairly 
consistent with Empiricist doctors of his time. A particularly striking example of his 
commitment to perception occurs in a longer description of his well-known 
demonstration of encephalocentrism, which involved the ligation of the recurrent 
laryngeal nerve in an effort to show that the brain was the starting point for the nerves 
involved in voice production,  
As you know, Alexander was known to everyone for this weakness [i.e. 
φιλονεικία), just as he also demonstrated at the time. For, I had just 
promised a demonstration involving the finest nerves: that there is a hair-
like pair of nerves inserted in the muscles of the larynx, on the left side 
and on the right; and, that in those cases in which the nerves are ligated by 
a snare or when they are severed, the animal becomes mute while not 
causing any damage to the animal or to its overall capacity to function. 
Before I began the demonstration, Alexander said, interrupting me, 
"Should this be granted to you first, that we must believe in empirical 
evidence?" Stepping away from them, I left, saying only this one thing, 
that I was mistaken to think that I had not come before some backwoods 
Pyrrhonists; otherwise, I would not have come at all.145    
                                                
144 See Dig.Puls. VIII 780-6 
145 Praen. XIV 628, γινώσκεις γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ πάθει πρὸς ἁπάντων καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος 
ἐγινώσκετο, καθάπερ καὶ τότε σαφῶς ἐδήλωσε. δεῖξιν γὰρ ὑποσχομένου μου νευρίων λεπτοτάτων, 
ὡς εἶναι τριχοειδῆ συζυγίαν τινὰ τοῖς τοῦ φάρυγγος μυσὶν ἐκφυομένην, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἀριστερῶν 
μερῶν, τοῖς δὲ ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν· ἐφ' οἷς βρόχῳ διαληφθεῖσιν, ἢ τμηθεῖσιν ἄφωνον γίνεται τὸ ζῶον, 
οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ζωήν τι βλαπτομένον, οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ὑποτυχὼν πρὶν δειχθῆναι, 
"τοῦτο πρῶτον," ἔφησεν, "ἄν σοι συγχωρηθείη, τοῖς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαινομένοις πιστεύειν 
ἡμᾶς δεῖν." ἀκούσας δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτα, καταλιπὼν αὐτοὺς ἐχωρίσθην ἓν μόνον φθεγξάμενος, ὡς 






This example, from Galen's treatise On Prognosis, involves Alexander of 
Damascus, a little known Peripatetic, who allegedly objected to or at least questioned the 
justificatory basis empirical evidence (τοῖς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαινομένοις) had for 
demonstration. In addition to being a vivid example of Galen's fondness for biting 
satire,146 the text here is both indicative of Galen's position on scepticism regarding 
empirical evidence and, in particular, his response to rejections of anatomy as a basis for 
medical investigation.147  
This second implication of the Alexander of Damascus passage is equally a dig at 
Empiricist doctors who rejected anatomy as a viable basis on which to make medical 
claims. The Empiricist objection to anatomy (notwithstanding their further objection to 
the cruelty of vivisection) was based both on ethical grounds and on a refusal to consider 
that anatomical information, obtained from dead bodies, was useful for the treatment of 
live bodies. As far as they were concerned, it required an unacceptable degree of 
analogical reasoning, as witnessed by Celsus,148 
                                                
146 Note the puns on δεῖξις throughout the quotation as well as Galen's coinage ἀγροικοπυῤῥωνεῖος, 
which I have translated 'backwoods Pyrrhonists' and which Galen uses variously elsewhere. 
147 This scenario and Galen's response to it are, given Alexander's Peripatetic background, ironically 
reminscent of Aristotle's own response to hardline scepticism regarding the reliability of the senses. 
According to Aristotle sceptics of this sort are little more than plants (ὅμοιος γὰρ φυτῷ τοιοῦτος ᾗ 
τοιοῦτος ἤδη) at Meta. 1006a15-16 and, more generally, throughout Meta. IV.4). It is possible, and if true 
amusing, to imagine that Galen is pointing up Alexander's alleged philoneikia by having a Peripatetic 
philosopher object to a fundamental principle of Aristotelian philosophy, the reliability of sensation. 
148 See Mudry (1982:107), "Il est révélateur à ce propos que les empiriques, qui refusent la dissection, 
n’envisagent pourtant pas d’autre méthode d’investigation anatomique que la connaissance directe." Also, 
Mudry (1982: 137), "Tout en rejetant catégoriquement la vivisection, les empiriques admettent pourtant 




For these reasons, that the dissection of the dead is not necessary (even if 
it isn't cruel, it is disgusting), since most things are changed in dead bodies 




Galen expanded the ambit of what counted toward πεῖρα by not only including 
anatomical training, investigation, and knowledge in it but also by basing his practice in 
large part on anatomical knowledge. And, given the evidence for the waning of 
anatomical knowledge and investigation after its heyday in the Hellenistic period, it is no 
surprise that Galen's objections to ignorance of it and even to ancient physics extended to 
many Dogmatists as well.150 
b) Intellectually Primitive Evidence 
 
Galen's dissatisfaction with the medical methods of other thinkers was not 
restricted to Dogmatists. He is equally biting with regard to the failings he sees in the 
broad approach of the Empiricists to medical knowledge. While, as far as Galen was 
concerned, the Dogmatists failed to provide proper justification for their arguments and 
to give proper weight to empirical observation, the Empiricists failed to accept a class of 
                                                                                                                                            
des blessures, peut être utile au médecin (la dissection, qui ne fait connaître que des organs morts, est 
excluée." I owe this reference to Dr. Marquis Berrey. 
149 De Medicina, 44, Ob haec ne mortuorum quidem lacerationem necessarium esse (quae etsi non crudelis, 
tamen foeda sit), cum aliter pleraque in mortuis se habeant; quantum vero in vivis cognosci potest, ipsa 
curatio ostendat. More generally, see De Medicina 40-44. 
150 Cf. MM X 169-170, Some of the Dogmatists are like them [sc. Empiricists] even if they don't want to 
be, however many can't make their way to the natural principles of the bodies by reason. For as I have 
shown earlier, these also are half-Empiricists, who couldn't understand primitive elements. (ὅμοιοι 
δ᾽αὐτοῖς εἰσι, κἂν μὴ θέλωσιν, ὅσοι τῶν Δογματιζινόντων ἐπὶ τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν σωμάτων 
οὐκ ἐνδυνήθησαν ἀναβῆναι τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ, καθότι πρόσθεν ἐδείξαμεν, ἐξ ἡμίσεώς εἰσι 




evidence into their epistemology. Galen treats this class, things that are evident to the 
mind, as playing an evidentiary role in medical epistemology even if he ultimately does 
not consider it a part of experience (ἐμπειρία),  
The ancient philosophers say that there are two kinds of phenomena:  
i) one part, which is consistent with the Empiricists, has to do with things 
that are known by some sensation (e.g., whiteness and blackness, hardness 
and softness, hot and cold, and so on;  
ii) another, indemonstrable, part that has to do with those things that come 
under observation of the intellect in their initial apprehension (e.g., things 
that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, and that if equals 
are added to equals the sums are equal, and if equals are subtracted from 
equals the remainders are equal). They also say, of this second class, that 
nothing comes to be without a cause, and that everything comes from 




This second class of evidence, things that are evident to the mind, is a sine qua 
non of justification for Galen.152 The notion that there is a class of things evident to the 
mind is already present in Platonic discussions of epistemology and more fully worked 
                                                
151 MM X 36, οἱ δ' αὖ παλαιοὶ φιλόσοφοι διττὸν γένος εἶναί φασι τῶν φαινομένων, ἓν μὲν, ὅπερ καὶ 
τοῖς ἐμπειρικοῖς ὁμολογεῖται, τῶν αἰσθήσει τινὶ διαγινωσκομένων, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος καὶ 
σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων 
νοήσει κατὰ πρώτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀναπόδεικτον, ὡς τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὑπάρχειν ἴσα, καὶ 
ἐὰν ἴσοις ἴσα προστεθῇ, καὶ τὰ ὅλα ἴσα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐὰν ἀπὸ ἴσων ἴσα ἀφαιρεθῇ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ 
ἴσα εἶναι. τοῦ τοιούτου γένους εἶναί φασι καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίγνεσθαι· καὶ πάντ' ἐξ ὄντος 
τινὸς, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδόλως ὄντος οὐδέν·   
152 See, for example, Hankinson (2008: 167), "In the case of geometry, these will be stipulative (yet self-
evident) definitions, plus a priori axioms such as those mentioned above. But how is the method to be 
applied in the case of an empirical science?". These sorts of axioms are also mentioned by me immediately 
above regarding MM X 36 and below in the context of Pecc.Dig. V 67. Pace Hankinson, it is unclear that 
to Galen geometry would have been a non-empirical science to the extent that both its definitions and 




out by Aristotle, principally in the Posterior Analytics (e.g., Post An 2).153  I have 
described the process by which Aristotle believes we come to know some of the members 
of this class earlier. Empiricists would object to the claim that there are items evident to 
the mind, on the largely a priori grounds that only the senses are reliable truth bearers. 
That is, this sort of mental grasping or seeing falls into the class of indications 
(ἐνδείξεις) to which the Empiricists in principle object.  
Part of the Galenic program for reliable epistemic claims requires not only that 
one follow the aesthetic phenomena to intellectually primitive evidence but also that, 
once that has been accomplished, one verify the soundness of resulting arguments by 
confirmation with empirical observations. For example, consider Galen's description of 
the way in which one can apply this method, common in fields such as engineering or 
geometry, to medical investigations,  
When you find your own method or when you use a method that has been 
taught to you by someone else and divide the line before you into however 
many parts you like, the matter will make itself evident to you. It will be 
rigorously manifest that all the parts divided in this way are equal. And it 
will also become manifest, by way of empirical observation, that all 
problems of this kind are discovered with certainty.154 
 
 
This translation, out of context, does not make clear what sort of phenomena are 
adequate criteria for confirmation for Galen. In what follows subsequently, however, 
                                                
153 Cf. Pecc.Dig. V 79 et passim for Galen's discussion of first principles as necessary to avoid an infinite 
explanatory or causal regress. 
154 See Pecc.Dig. V 67, ἐὰν γὰρ εὑρὼν μέθοδον ἰδίαν ἢ παρ' ἑτέρου | διδαχθείσῃ χρώμενος εἰς 
ὅσαπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃς μέρη τὴν προτεθεῖσαν εὐθεῖαν διορίσῃς, αὐτὸ μαρτυρήσει σοι τὸ πρᾶγμα, 
φανεῖταί τε ἅπαντα τὰ μέρη τῆς οὕτω διαιρεθείσης ἀκριβῶς ἴσα, φανεῖται δὲ καὶ τὰ <λοιπὰ> 




Galen creates a fuller context for the phrase, translated here "on the basis of things that 
are clearly evident" (δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων). In the following two 
chapters, he gives a relatively lengthy example of the successful geometric construction 
of a circumscribed polygon. At Pecc. Dig. V 68 he makes it clear that confirmation of its 
construction is visually apparent, although Galen is not excluding the confirmation of 
other proofs through mentally evident evidence. Of a piece with the geometric examples 
mentioned earlier, Galen proceeds to discuss how this is also the method commonly used 
in astronomy and 'architecture' (ἀρχιτεκτονία), which he tells the reader includes the 
engineering of sundials, waterclocks, and other mechanical devices.  
Galen endorses the Empiricist's belief in the power of and the need for direct 
observation and testing, in the sense of πεῖρα, for the epistemic medical claims. He 
simultaneously echoes the Empiricist's objections to Dogmatist theorizing, on the 
grounds that it is merely plausible without some empirical evidence with which to 
underpin such theories down. On the other hand, Galen bristles at the limits that 
Empiricists place on theoretical and causal medical accounts. He does so on the grounds 
that observation without some organizing principle leaves medical discovery up to 
chance, which not only cripples medical progress but also is disingenuous (cf. the 
discovery of the cupping glass and of certain complex drugs, whose utility is not itself a 
matter of question).  
The force of both the cupping glass example as well as the case of complex drugs 




concatenation of chance observations. Complex drugs, in particular, have on Galen's 
construal strongly emergent properties (i.e., they are not evident in any one of their 
ingredients or even in incomplete groupings of those ingredients). Consequently, the 
Empiricist is at pains to explain how Empiricism, with its adherence to non-experimental 
observation, can generate these sorts of remedies, whose utility according to Galen they 
do concede. Additionally, Galen correctly chastises the Empiricists' skepticism with 
regard to hidden structures, entities, and principles (e.g., anatomy and fundamental 
physical principles) on the grounds that this scepticism groundlessly proscribes robust 
tools for diagnosis and the determination of therapy. By taking on board an empirical 
method for verifying his theoretical claims and explaining those claims through a rational 
method, Galen attempted to forge a middle path that aimed at a coherent and effective 
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